포클랜드 전쟁 이후 노트 리뷰 논쟁과 영국 국방정책 방향성에 대한 고찰 = The Post-Falklands War Nott Review Debate and the Direction of UK Defence Policy

국문 초록 (Abstract)

영국은 포클랜드 전쟁에서 승리했지만, 1981년 존 노트의 국방백서에 언급된 해군력 감축 문제 때문에 많은 논란을 겼었다. 냉전 시대 갈등이 한창이었던 때 작성된 일명 ‘노트 리뷰’는 소련과의 대잠전 대비와 핵억지력 유지를 강조했고, 반면 상륙함, 항공모함, 수상함 등의 감축을 계획했다. 하지만 포클랜드 전쟁 결과 감축의 대상이었던 수상함들이 승리의 결정적인 역할을 했음이 증명되자, 노트 리뷰의 타당성에 대한 문제가 제기되었다. 하지만 장기적인 차원에서 포클랜드 전쟁의 예외성에 근거하여 1981년 국방백서의 타당성을 판단하는 것은 섣부른 결과를 낳을 수 있다. 따라서 본 논문은 1990년대 이루어진 세 차례 국방검토인 1990년 <변화를 위한 옵션(Options for Change)>, 1994년 <최전선 우선: 국방비용 연구(Front Line First: The Defence Costs Study)>, 1998년 <전략국방검토(The Strategic Defence Review)>을 바탕으로 포클랜드 전쟁 이후 영국 국방정책의 방향성을 고찰한 결과 영국의 해양 전략이 현실적인 예산 문제와 동떨어져 있음을 비판한다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The United Kingdom won the Falklands War, but it was controversial because of the naval cuts envisioned in John Nott's 1981 Defense White Paper. Written at the height of the Cold War conflict, the so-called “Nott Review” emphasized preparing for anti-submarine warfare against the Soviet Union and maintaining a nuclear deterrent, while planning cuts to landing ships, aircraft carriers, and surface ships. But when the Falklands War proved that the surface ships targeted for cuts played a crucial role in victory, the validity of the Nott Review was called into question. However, in the long run, it would be premature to judge the validity of the 1981 Defense White Paper based on the exceptionality of the Falklands War. This paper therefore examines the direction of UK defence policy since the Falklands War, drawing on the three defence reviews of the 1990s -Options for Change in 1990, Front Line First: The Defence Costs Study in 1994 and The Strategic Defence Review in 1998- and argues that the UK’s maritime strategy has become unconnected to realistic budgetary concerns.

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