대전 전투와 미군의 전투효율성 = Battle of Daejeon and Combat Effectiveness of the U.S. Forces

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The first United States' division into the Korean War was the 24th Infantry Division, which had been in occupation mission in Japan since the end of World War Ⅱ. The division continued retreating from the beginning; Osan,Pyeongtaek- Anseong, Chonan, Jeonui-Jochiwon, Gongju, Daepyeongni, and Daejeon. It's main mission was to stop in some point the North Korean forces with delaying action. The division, however, met a severe blow at Daejeon and stopped temporarily as a fighting unit. Even though it is now clear that the major factor for its loss of Daejeon is the lack of forces against the North Koreans, this explanation seems to be too simplistic. Using an approach of 'combat effectiveness,' one could answer what happened and how the Americans fought at Daejeon more accurately.
Among other factors, leadership, intelligence, firepower and maneuver,control and communication, and training has been selected for the factors of combat power. And, contrary to the common understanding of lack of leadership among regimental and divisional commanders as the key factor for failure, the division's leadership was as normal as other divisions. Instead,other factors influenced battle performance of the division more than leadership. Special mention should be given to training. The division and others too has been indifferent to training during the peace time and forgot what should be main effort as military units. Making a fighting unit is not,and has not been easy task, but this is an common wisdom that should not be forgotten in the peace time.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

미 제24사단은 6․25전쟁에 참전한 최초의 미군 사단이었다. 사단은 죽미령, 평택-안성, 천안, 전의-조치원, 공주-대평리를 거쳐 지연전을 수행하면서 후퇴를 거듭하였다. 그리고 대전에서 결정적인 패배를 경험하였다. 세계 최정예 군대인 미군이 신생 군대인 북한군에게 패배한 이유를 병력의 절대적 부족 때문이라고 답하기에는 너무 단순한 접근이다. 대전 전투의 실상을 ‘전투 효율성’이라는 접근방법을 이용하여 분석함으로써 구체적이고 명확한 답을 구하고자 하였다.
리더십, 정보, 화력과 기동, 통제와 통신, 그리고 훈련 요인을 선택적으로 선정하여 분석한 결과 병력 부족 이외에 지금까지 알려진 것과 달리 리더십보다는 다른 요소들이 결정적인 역할을 하였음을 알 수 있다. 특히, 평시의 훈련 부족으로인한 전투 능력의 저하는 부대의 전체적인 전투력을 약화시키는 결과를 초래하였다. 따라서 평시에도 ‘싸우는 군대’를 육성하기 위해 노력해야 된다는 평범한 진리가 다시 한 번 강조되고 있다.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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