The Relationship between Related Party Transactions and Management Forecasts = 특수관계자거래와 경영자예측과의 관계

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구는 특수관계자거래가 경영자의 예측정보 공시행태에 어떠한 영향을 미치는 지 분석하였다. 분석 대상은 한 개인에게 소유권이 집중되어 있어, 기업 집단 전체에 상당한 지배력을 갖고 있는 재벌이라는 독특한 지배구조를 갖고 있는 한국 기업을 대상으로 하며, 분석기간은 공정 공시제도가 도입되어 영업실적에 대한 예측치를 공시한 2002년부터 2009년까지로 하였다. 구체적으로 특수관계자 간의 실질적인 거래가 경영자 예측정보의 편의와 예측 정확도에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지 실증분석하였다.
특수관계자거래가 많은 기업들은 제국주의적 성향이 강하고(조정은과 김상일 2013) 상대적으로 내부통제가 취약하여(AICPA 2001) 경영자예측정보의 공시품질이 낮고, 과대화 성향을 나타낼 가능성이 높다고 할 수 있습니다.
또한, 최대주주의 지분율이 큰 기업은 특수관계자 거래를 통제하기가 쉽고, 다른 기업에 비해 외부이해 관계자가 상대적으로 적다. 따라서 경영자 예측정보에 신경을 덜 쓰게 되고, 예측편의와 예측오차는 커지게 된다. 반면에 회사와 관련된 재무분석가의 수가 많은 경우에는 회사에 대한 시장에서의 정보수요가 많다는 것을 의미하므로, 특수관계자 거래가 많은 기업이라 할지라도 경영자 예측정보를 공시할 때 신중을 기하게 되어 예측편의와 예측오차는 작아지게 된다.
실증분석 결과, 특수관계자 거래가 많은 기업일수록 경영자 예측편의와 예측오차가 커지는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 특수관계자 거래가 클수록 경영자가 경영자 예측정보를 공시할 때, 자의적으로 성과를 과대 예측하는 경향이 있으며 이에 따라 예측정확도도 감소하는 것으로 해석된다.
또한 최대주주의 지분율이 높아질 경우 특수관계자 거래 증가에 따라 경영자 편의와 예측오차는 더욱 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 최대주주 지분율이 높은 경우 특수관계자 거래를 다른 이해관계자로부터 간섭받지 않고 할 수 있으므로, 자의적인 거래를 더욱 증가시킬 수 있으며, 경영자 예측의 상향성을 더욱 증가시킬 수 있고 이에 따라 예측정확성은 감소하는 상황이 된다. 마지막으로, 재무분석가 수가 많은 기업일수록 특수관계자 거래 증가에 따른 경영자 예측편의의 증가 정도가 감소하는 것으로 나타났는데, 이는 해당 기업에 대한 시장수요가 많은 기업의 경우는 특수관계자 거래가 많은 기업일지라도 경영자 예측정보 산출에 신중을 기하는 것으로 해석된다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Using a comprehensive sample of listed firms in Korea, we investigate the empirical association between related party transactions (hereafter, RPTs) and management forecasts. This paper discusses the impact of RPTs on management forecasts in Korea where RPTs are prevalent and strict requirements for disclosure of RPTs are conducive to RPTs dealings. Sample period is 8 years from 2002 when voluntary disclosure was enacted to 2009. Specifically, we empirically examine the effect of RPTs on management forecast bias and accuracy.
Firms with frequent RPTs are likely to show managerial empire building(Cho and Kim 2013) and relatively weak internal control(AICPA 2001). Therefore, the quality of management forecasts may be overoptimistic and poor.
Firms with majority shareholders have more control over RPTs and fewer external interest parties. These firms pay less attention to management forecasts, which leads to increased management forecast errors and inaccuracy. By contrast, firms with large number of analyst followings pay more attention to management forecasts due to high demand for information in the market.
Results show that management forecast bias and errors decrease as RPTs increases. This suggests that RPTs increase managers’ tendency to disclose overoptimistic management forecasts.
This effect is intensified in firms with majority shareholder suggesting that these firms may increase discretionary transactions as less interested parties monitor them. Therefore, these firms are likely to release overoptimistic forecasts which leads to less accurate management forecasts. Finally, firms with large analyst followings, management forecast accuracy decreases relatively less as RPTs increases. This means that even if firms have frequent RPTs, they tend to pay close attention to disclose management forecasts when with large market information demands.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Abstract
• 국문초록
• Ⅰ. Introduction
• Ⅱ. Hypotheses Development
• Ⅲ. Research Design and Sample Selection
• Ⅳ. Empirical Results
• Ⅴ. Conclusions
• References

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