과당경쟁(過當競爭)과 정부규제(政府規制) = In Search of "Excess Competition"

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구는 과잉투자(過剩投資)나 과당경쟁(過當競爭)이 발생할 수 있는 객관적인 기준과 경제적 조건들을 분석하고, 정부규제(政府規制)의 근거로서 제시되는 과잉투자(過剩投資)-과당경쟁(過當競爭)의 개념과 논리의 타당성 및 이에 대한 정책적(政策的) 대응방향(對應方向)을 검토하였다. 본고(本稿)에서 필자(筆者)들은 유지불가능한 자연독점의 경우를 제외하면 시장수요(市場需要)의 사전적(事前的) 불확실성(不確實性)으로 인해 발생하는 사후적(事後的) 설비부족(設備不足)이나 유휴설구(遊休設構)는 발생할 수 있지만, 투자시점에서의 과잉투자는 발생할 수 없음을 모형의 분석을 통해 보였다. 설비투자 완료후 생산(生産)-판매단계(販賣段階)에서 유휴설비가 발생하였을 경우에 정부(政府)가 경쟁을 제한할 수 있다는 예상이 오히려 과잉설비투자를 초래하는 중요한 원인임을 보이고, 일관성 있는 정부불개입정책(政府不介入政策)의 유지가 과잉설비투자를 억제하는 최선의 정책임을 보였다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Korean firms of all sizes, from virtually every industry, have used and are using the term "excessive competition" to describe the state of their industry and to call for government interventions. Moreover, the Korean government has frequently responded to such calls in various ways favorable to the firms, such as controlling entry, curbing capacity investments, or allowing collusion. Despite such interventions' impact on the overall efficiency on the Korean economy as well as on the wealth distribution among diverse groups of economic agents, the term "excessive competition", the basis for the interventions, has so far escaped rigorous scrutiny. The objective of this paper is to clarify the notion of "excessive competition" and "over-investment" which usually accompanies "excessive competition", and to examine the circumstances under which they might occur. We first survey the cases where the terms are most widely used and proceed to examine those cases to determine if competition is indeed excessive, and if so, what causes "excessive competition". Our main concern deals with the case in which the firms must make investment decisions that involve large sunk costs while facing uncertain demand. In order to analyze this case, we developed a two period model of capacity precommitment and the ensuing competition. In the first period, oligopolistic firms make capacity investments that are irreversible. Demand is uncertain in period 1 and only the distribution is known. Thus, firms must make investment decisions under uncertainty. In the second period, demand is realized, and the firms compete with quantity under realized demand and capacity constraints. In the above setting, we find that there is "no over-investment," en ante, and there is "no excessive competition," ex post. As measured by the information available in period 1, expected return from investment of a firm is non-negative, overall industry capacity does not exceed the socially optimal level, and competition in the second period yields an outcome that gives each operating firm a non-negative second period profit. Thus, neither "excessive competition" nor "over-investment" is possible. This result will generally hold true if there is no externality and if the industry is not a natural monopoly. We also extend this result by examining a model in which the government is an active participant in the game with a well defined preference. Analysis of this model shows that over-investment arises if the government cannot credibly precommit itself to non-intervention when ex post idle capacity occurs, due to socio-political reasons. Firms invest in capacities that exceed socially optimal levels in this case because they correctly expect that the government will find it optimal for itself to intervene once over-investment and ensuing financial problems for the firms occur. Such planned over-investment and ensuing government intervention are the generic problems under the current system. These problems are expected to be repeated in many industries in years to come, causing a significant loss of welfare in the long run. As a remedy to this problem, we recommend a non-intervention policy by the government which creates and utilizes uncertainty. Based upon an argument which is essentially the same as that of Kreps and Wilson in the context of a chain-store game, we show that maintaining a consistent non-intervention policy will deter a planned over-investment by firms in the long run. We believe that the results obtained in this paper has a direct bearing on the public policies relating to many industries including the petrochemical industry that is currently in the center of heated debates.