미국 사이버 안보전략의 변화와 이론적 함의 = The Change of US Cybersecurity Strategy and Its Theoretical Implications

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Cyber threats have been responded with the framework of traditional security strategies and practices, but the growing threat of cyberattacks from foreign countries could not be prevented and deterred effectively. Cyber weapons are different from kinetic forces or nuclear bombs, because they are developed secretly and inexpensively and non-state actors became a major player. In addition, cyber retaliation or punishment may create the cybersecurity dilemma in which cyber actions and reactions can escalate into cyber war that makes it hard for major states to protect their national interests. However, the Obama administration had changed the U.S. cyber deterrence strategy into proactive one. The Trump administration publicly announced that the U.S. has a strong will to eliminate any cyber threats in their origins and use a cyber tool to weaken security threats. As a preemptive strike, 'defend forward' and 'persistent engagement' are key elements in the U.S. DoD cyber strategy and Cyber Command's vision. Those preemptive cyber activities are conducted covertly and clandestinely. Although they impose political or economic costs upon an opponent, the offensive cyber operations force her to accept the burden without any open retaliation. The competing state also will be careful not to escalate cyber conflict. Consequently, the adversary as well as the U.S. adapt implicitly the limits of offensive cyber operations. International norms to curb malicious cyber activities can be constructed through the cyber preemptive strategy.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

사이버 안보위협은 기존의 안보전략과 관행으로 대응해 왔지만 전통적인 안보구조처럼 외부의 악의적 사이버활동을 효과적으로 예방하고 억제하지 못하고 있다. 사이버수단은 재래식 무기 혹은 핵무기와 전혀 다르게 은밀하고 저렴한 비용으로 개발되고, 비국가 행위자들도 손쉽게 활용하여 사이버 국제안보질서에 영향을 미칠 수 있다. 더욱이 사이버 보복과 응징은 사이버 확전의 위험을 감당해야 하는 딜레마를 조성한다. 하지만 최강대국인 미국은 오바마 행정부 이후 행정부와 국방부가 수정된 사이버전략을 공개하고 있다. 트럼프 행정부는 선제적 사이버공격전략을 공개 천명하였고, 사이버 위협을 방지하고 여타 안보위협을 해소하는 대체 방안으로 사이버 비밀공작을 적극 활용하겠다는 전략의 기조를 발표했다. 외교와 전쟁이 아닌 선제적 사이버 비밀공작은 ‘선제 방어’와 ‘지속적 관여’의 전략 개념으로 명확하게 드러났다. 미국의 새로운 전략은 이론적으로 전쟁에 미치지 못한 위협의 방식으로 상대방에게 비용을 누적시키면서도 확전의 위험을 선제공격의 피해국 역시 고려하도록 역이용하는 것이다. 또한 선제적 사이버 비밀공작은 비밀스런 행위이지만 자국의 의지와 의도를 신호 보내는 방식이고, 이를 통해 상호 용인되는 사이버 위협활동에 대해 상호 암묵적인 합의점을 도출할 수 있다는 것이다. 이점은 국제규범이 발달하지 못한 사이버공간에서 비밀공작을 통해 규범을 구축하는 방식으로 과거와는 전혀 다른 효과이다.

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