KCI등재
보스니아, 북아일랜드 평화협정 사례연구 : 보스니아 내전과 데이턴 평화협정의 교훈 = The Bosnian Conflict and the Dayton Peace Accord
저자
발행기관
학술지명
권호사항
발행연도
2000
작성언어
Korean
KDC
390.000
등재정보
KCI등재
자료형태
학술저널
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The Balkan region has historically been an area of tension and conflict, owing much to the co-existence of five ethnic groups speaking four different languages. Since 1389, when the Osman Turks conquered Serbia, the Balkan territory was divided into separate spheres of influence, the northern area under the influence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the southern assimilated into the Muslim culture. In the first half of this century, the Serbs found themselves fighting against Croatians and Slovenians, thus leading to the ethnic conflict that has carried on to this day. Although the hostilities were put aside under the leadership of Josip Tito when he united the people under socialist Yugoslavia, tensions flared up again after his death in 1980.
The Bosnian conflict, which lasted for 3 years and 7 months from April 1992 until the end of 1995, was, in short, the struggle for independence by the different nations under the Serbia-dominated Federation. Adding to the complexity was the forceful resistance by the Serbian militia who opposed the independence movement in each of the republics. The crisis began with the proclamation of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, which triggered similar movement in neighboring Bosnia. Following the aborted referendum that was to decide Bosnia's fate, violent clashes ensued. The situation worsened with respective interventions by Serbia and Croatia.
During the early stages of the conflict, it seemed as if a peaceful resolution could be reached. Representatives of the European Community and later the United Nations spent many months trying to find a solution acceptable to Milosevic, the leader of the Serbs. Nonetheless, as doubts grew concerning the motives of Milosevic and the federal army, the UN Security Council decided to send in troops to Croatia and posed economic sanctions on the Yugoslav Federation. The purpose was to get the Bosnian Serbs out of Bosnia, but the results were unsatisfactory.
The response of the U.S. and Western European governments, Russia, and the UN has been generally deemed irresponsible with destructive consequences. Despite a series of arbitrary actions of Milosevic's Serbian government and the Serbian-dominated federal army leadership, the aforementioned powers have only belatedly decided on economic sanctions and implementation of a no-fly zone. The United States, in particular, has somewhat reluctantly taken on the responsibility of finding a solution for the crisis in Bosnia due to pressures arising from public opinion. But, still haunted by the trauma of Vietnam, U.S. actions have remained at providing emergency relief as opposed to direct military intervention. The United Nations has also restrained from direct intervention, although it had hinted at the possible use of force from the beginning. Due to the passive attitude of the UN, the risk of casualties, limited activities of the UNPROFOR, and conflicting national interests, active peacekeeping was virtually impossible. It was the international community's cries for action at the appalling news of ethnic genocide being carried out by the Bosnian Serbs and the dissolution of the Vance-Owen peace proposal that led the UN to order NATO air strikes on the Serbs. The fighting ended temporarily with Carter's mediation, and the ensuing diplomatic efforts by Holbrooke led to the signing of the peace accord The peace agreement, reached in November 1995, was the culmination of U.S. diplomacy and its initiative in the actual negotiations. To achieve the objective of the "51-49 territorial division", however, NATO air strikes had to continue. In addition to the division of territory, the warring parties agreed to the retention of the Yugoslav federation, a unified Sarajevo, and the importation of UN peacekeeping troops.
The Bosnian conflict, which produced 200,000 casualties and more than 3 million refugees, holds important lessons for the future. First, it has shown that mediation efforts through mere diplomacy only tend to prolong tensions. Second, the use of force in dealing with internal affairs of another sovereign nation requires meticulous planning and preparation. Third, once involved, there must be a clear objective at hand, without internal division or hesitation. In the Balkan region, the fundamental problems remain. As such, the Dayton peace accord may serve only as an ad-hoc solution.
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