중국의 반부패 역량 강화와 집단시위 대응전략의 변화

국문 초록 (Abstract)

이 연구는 집단시위에 강경 일변도였던 중국 지도부가 무엇 때문에 강경에서 온건으로 시위 대응 전략을 부분 선회했는지에 대한 의문으로 시작하였다. 이에 대해 개혁?개방 이후 지방 분권화 상황에서 중국의 반부패 역량 강화가 집단시위 대응전략에 어떤 영향을 미치는지 규명해 보았다.
1978년 개혁?개방 이후 중앙정부는 경제발전을 위해 지방 분권화의 조치로 지방정부에 자율권을 부여했다. 이런 과정에서 중앙정부는 시위 통제를 비롯한 국유기업 관리 권한을 각급 지방정부에 이양하였다. 이 때문에 지방에서 대규모 집단시위가 발생하여도 중앙정부가 직접 관여하기보다는 지방정부의 대응을 관망하는 현상이 발생하였다. 하지만 부패 처분에 대해서는 중앙정부가 직접 개입한다. 특히 2000년대 폭발적으로 증가하는 중국의 집단시위는 불합리한 노사관계, 토지 강제 환수, 무리한 집단 이주, 급격한 기업 구조조정 등 주로 지방 당 간부들의 부패와 전횡에서 비롯되었다. 이와 맞물려 중국정부는 1990년대 후반부에 본격적으로 부패방지 제도화를 시작했으며, 2000년대 들어서 적극적인 부패 척결 시스템을 갖추기 시작했다. 이러한 반부패 규정 강화는 지방 관료의 부패로 말미암아 집단시위가 발생했을 때, 지방정부로 하여금 비용-편익의 관점에서 강경대응보다는 온건대응을 선택하게 하였다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study aimed to investigate external factors and systemic changes regarding the reason why the Chinese government, which had consistently taken a firm attitude toward collective protests, chose to adopt the concession strategy instead of coercive strategy.
Since China’s reform and opening, the central government gave autonomy to local governments as a step to promote decentralization and economic development. However, when it comes to handling corruption, the central government directly exercises control over the affair. In particular, most of collective protests, which have increased dramatically since the early 2000s in China, resulted from local government elites’ corruption and arbitrary decisions, such as irrational labor-management relations, forced land escheat, unreasonable collective migrations, and radical restructuring of enterprises. At the same time, the Chinese government started to seriously institutionalize anti-corruption systems in the late 1990s. Hence, active systems to eradicate corruption emerged in 2000. Therefore, when a collective protest took place because of corruption and arbitrary decisions by a local government, such an act strengthening the anti-corruption regulations made the local government choose moderate reactions rather than coercive strategy, from the perspective of a cost-benefit analysis.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 서론
• Ⅱ. 양보전략의 외부 요인─ 분권화와 시위대상의 변화
• Ⅲ. 양보전략의 내부 요인─ 지방정부의 양보전략 동인(動因)
• Ⅳ. 중국의 부패 방지 제도화
• Ⅴ. 결론
• 참고문헌
• 국문초록
• Abstract

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