교범이 된 거짓말 = 쿠바 미사일 위기와 1차 북핵위기에서 Trollope 기법

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper shows that Trollope ploy, a negotiation tactic for a receiver to interpret unclear offers or agreements favorably to its interests, was not applied in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite the fact that several participants of the ExComm proposed it, Attorney-General Robert Kennedy did not use the ploy in the private negotiation with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on 27 October 1962. While the United States government kept the documents related to the crisis classified, the allegation that the Kennedy Administration relied on the tactic has evolved into a myth and even a manual in international negotiation.
The Clinton Administration utilized Trollope ploy in interpreting the Carter-Kim agreement in June 1994. President Clinton referred to the ploy as the US response to the Cater-Kim agreement, which was broadcasted by CNN on June 16, 1994. The Clinton Administration added North Korea's unilateral freezing of nuclear activities and no refueling into the agreement. North Korea accepted the two additional conditions to reopen the dialogue between the two states.
Costly Signaling Theory provides a hint to explain why the Kennedy Administration could not utilize the tactic in the Cuban Missile Crisis, while the Clinton Administration did it in June 1994. As the domestic audience cost of Khrushchev's public message on 27 October 1962 was higher than that of his private letter on the previous day, the Kennedy Administration came to believe that the public message was more honest than the private message. Meanwhile, though the Carter-Kim agreement did not meet the US demand upon North Korea, the Clinton Administration believed that the Carter-Kim agreement had honest messages toward the United States. The possible US annulment would have brought a severe domestic audience cost against the North Korean leader, as it would have tainted the North Korean leader's credibility.

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