적절성 이론에서의 한정지시 = Definite Reference in Relevance Theory

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In speaking and listening people make essential use of a great deal of world knowledge that they share with each other. Using this notion of speaker — hearers shared knowledge or mutual knowledge, many scholars concerns themselves with specifying the condition under which a speaker can appropriately use a definite referring expression. They propose the necessary condition for definite reference that the referent be not only known to the speaker and hearer, but mutually known.
We point out some problems of the mutual knowledge requirement for the use of the definite reference. It is shown that the mutual knowledge is too strong requirement and empirically inadequate notion for the definite reference.
Instead of mutual knowledge, we adopt the weaker notion of ‘mutual manifestness’ from Sperber & Wilson’s Relevance Theory and show this notion has more explanatory adequacy than mutual knowledge in the explanation of definite reference. Our notion of what is manifest to an individual is clearly weaker than the notion of what is actually known or assumed. A fact can be manifest without being known.
This paper shows that mutual manifestness is not merely weak-er than mutual knowledge ; it is weaker in just the right way. It is not open to the same psychological objections, since the claim that an assumption is mutually manifest is a claim about cognitive environments rather than mental states or processes. The preference of mutual manifestness hypothesis to mutual knowledge hypothesis is indirectly supported by the fact that Hawkins(1978), one of the strongest advocates of mutual knowledge requirement for the definite reference, changed his position and came to argue for the mutual manifestness: “…the existence and uniqueness of a definite referent within the intended P—set should always be mutually manifest in actual language use, but not necessarily mutually known in advance”(Hawkins, 1991: 249).