미국의 외국투자자에 대한 대내 직접투자 규제와 국가안전보장의 심사 = The National Security Test and Regulations of Foreign Direct Investment within the U.S.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The Exon–Florio provision is a law that was enacted by the United States Congress in 1988 to review foreign investment within the U.S. The provision was sponsored by Senator Jim James Exon Jr. and Representative James J. Florio. The amendment was passed into law under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 and amended Section 721 of Defense Production Act of 1950. The amendment was proposed over concerns of foreign acquisitions by Japanese businesses. Under the provision, all foreign investments that might affect national security may be reviewed and if deemed to pose a threat to security, the President of the U.S. may block the investment. According to the section of the provision, the president may block the investment when “there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe that the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national security.” U.S. former President Reagan delegated the review process to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CIFUS). Under the Exon–Florio Amendment, Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), the President has the authority to review all mergers, acquisitions and takeovers that could result in foreign control of a U.S. business and suspend, block or order divestiture of any such transaction if it may threaten to impair national security. The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA), which amended Section 721 and formally established CFIUS, mandated the Guidance. The Treasury Department recently published its final regulations implementing FINSA. Section 721 intentionally does not define what may constitute “national security.” Instead, the Guidance states that CFIUS analyzes the facts and circumstances of each transaction to identify what, if any, national security considerations are raised. National security risk is analyzed based on the potential “threat” (i.e., foreign person’s intent or ability to cause harm) to U.S. national security, whether there is a “vulnerability” (i.e., whether the nature of the U.S. business makes it susceptible to impairment of national security), and the possible consequences for U.S. national security resulting from the interaction between threat and vulnerability. Transactions reviewed by CFIUS have involved U.S. businesses that provide products and services to U.S. Government agencies and state and local authorities. This includes not only companies in the defense, security and law enforcement sectors, but companies that supply goods and services to U.S. Government agencies with functions relevant to national security, such as information technology, telecommunications, energy, natural resources, and industrial products. Transactions reviewed by CFIUS have also involved U.S. businesses (without regard to government contracts), where there are national security implications, including: (i) companies in the energy sector; (ii) companies that affect the nation’s transportation system; (iii) companies that could significantly and directly affect the U.S. financial system; (iv) companies that produce certain types of advanced technologies(such as, among others, semiconductors, cryptography and Internet security); (v) companies that are engaged in research, development, production or sale of technology, goods, software or services subject to U.S. export controls; and (vi) where U.S. critical infrastructure is involved, including major energy assets. With regard to the identity of the foreign person acquiring control, CFIUS considers the factors set forth in Section 721, including, among others, (a) the record of such person’s country with respect to nonproliferation and other national security matters, (b) the record and intentions of such person regarding actions that could impair U.S. national security, and (c) whether the transaction is foreign government controlled. The Guidance emphasizes that the examples provided are only “illustrative” and not an exhaustive list of transactions of concern to CFIUS; however, it does provide some additional transparency regarding the CFIUS process which may be useful to parties in assessing whether to file a CFIUS notice.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본고는 미국에서 2007년 국가안보의 관점에서의 대내 직접투자 규제법으로서 ‘외국인 투자 및 국가안보법’(Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, FINSA)이 엑슨?플로리오법(Exon?Florio Provision)을 대체하면서 등장한 여러 가지 법적쟁점에 대한 논의를 하였다. 특히 Ralls 사건을 분석함으로서 실제 사건에서 위 법률이 어떻게 적용되는지에 관한 지식을 얻을 수 있다. 엑슨?플로리오법(Exon?Florio Provision)은 미국 의회가 자국내 외국투자자본에 대한 제재를 가하고자 제정한 법이다. 이 법의 주요내용은 외국투자자가 미국내 산업에 투자함으로서 해당분야가 미국의 국가안보에 심각한 영향을 끼칠 경우 대통령이 이를 막을 수 있다는 것이다. 다만, 관련 외국자본에 의한 투자가 국가안보에 심각한 위협을 가한다고 판단될 때에 한정한다. 로널드 레이건 행정부 시절 도입됐다. 제임스 엑슨 상원의원과 제임스 플로리오 하원의원이 발의하여 지지했기에 법률의 명칭이 엑슨-플로리오법이 됐으며 당시 법안 발의는 일본계 기업의 미국 내 확장에 따른 불안감이 나타났기 때문이다. 현재 외국인투자심의위원회(Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, CFIUS)는 다음과 같은 사항을 결정하기 위하여 외국 투자거래와 관련된 모든 사건들을 조사하고 있다. (1) 외국 투자거래가 국가안전보장을 침해하는 위협이 있는지 여부, (2) 미합중국 기업을 인수하고자 하는 외국기업이 외국정부에 의하여 지배를 받고 있는지 여부, (3) 외국기업이 인수하고자 하는 거래가 사회기반구조의 관리에 있어서 국가안전보장에 손상을 가할 수 있는 심각한 수준의 결과를 초래하는지 여부 등이다. 심사대상인 외국투자 거래는 미합중국 내에서의 주간통상과 관련된 어떤 사람에 의해서든지 외국인이 관리하는 것으로 밝혀진 적대적 인수합병, 인수, 합병이라고 규정하고 있다. 연방 재무부의 행정규칙은 심사대상이 된 거래로 분류된 것들 중에서 특정한 유형의 거래들은 배제하고 있다. 그러므로 이러한 유형의 거래는 CFIUS의 조사대상에 속하지 않는다. 이와 같은 거래는 오로지 투자목적으로만 수행된 거래이거나 외국투자자가 기본적인 사업상의 결정을 한 사람이 아닌 투자인 경우에 해당한 것으로 특정하고 있다.

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