공동규제(Co-regulation) 활용방안에 관한 연구(II)

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

I. Research Background and Objective□Background of the Research○As a sequel to the 2008 KIPA Research Report, `A Study on Introduction of Co- regulation into Korea,` this study is a comprehensive and in- depth study on co- regulation systems in Korea.○The 2008 Report was intended to introduce the concept of coregulations systems and to redefine and analyze current regulatory systems in the major areas which had been operated under the title of `self- regulations` in Korea.- For the purpose, it reviewed the co- regulatory systems in EU countries and found lessons from their experience in systems and operation of the co- regulations. Utilizing the frames for analysis in the EU studies as a research tool, it diagnosed the regulatory systems and operating mechanism in the areas of Internet Contents, Internet Advertising, and Stock and Finance Markets in Korea.□Objective of the Research○Based on the results and theoretical framework of the 2008 Report, this 2009 study investigates the current situation of co- regulation systems in Korea by conducting survey research.○The survey poll of participants (Self- Regulatory Organizations(SROs), SRO members, relevant public officials and citizen groups or NGOs) in the co- regulation systems, specifically, was designed to find out recognition gaps by the participants, the pros and cons of the current co- regulation systems, and ways and suggestions to reinvigorate the co- regulation systems.II. Main Research Questions and Analysis Results□What are the relationships among participants as the current situation of co- regulation systems in Korea?○Relationships between government and SROs: it appears that the government is heavily involved in SRO operations by means of control, approval, and permission. As a result of the survey, the members of SROs and NGOs or citizen groups regard the relationship as `vertical` rather than `horizontal.` Most of the SROs do business for the government, or by delegation and trust of the government.○Relationships between SROs and their members: the SROs provide members with more than the interests for their business so that they have substantial influence on them. It would be an exaggeration, however, to say that they have a strong hold on their members because they lack effective ways and means to impose sanctions against violators of self- regulation. On the contrary, compared to the SROs, the majority of their members think that the relationship is `conflicting.`○Relationships between SROs and NGOs: basically, it is not easy to define the relationships between SROs and citizen groups or NGOs because the contacts are rare. Synthetically, since the SROs and their members tend to have a negative perception of citizen groups or NGOs` capabilities and roles, it appears that they commonly do not want the citizen groups` involvement in their business.○In sum, the co- regulation systems in Korea are characterized by strong intervention of the government in the SROs and the SROs` strong hold over their members.□What is the evaluation of the co- regulation systems in Korea?○There are wide variations in the participants` evaluation of coregulation systems in Korea.○While the SROs and citizen groups make a positive evaluation, it appears that the SRO members have negative perceptions about the co- regulation systems, especially the role of SROs.□What are the problems of the co- regulation system in Korea?○The SROs as key actors in co- regulation systems not only lack representativeness and sufficient capabilities to play their roles efficiently but also show wide variation in their capabilities and resources.○Since the SROs rely heavily on government, there are some concerns that they may belong to the government.○There are wide differences in mutual recognition and understanding between SROs and their members. The members of SROs have high level of complaints and dissatisfaction against the SROs in terms of validity of self- regulations (rules) and fairness in operating the systems.○The SROs cannot impose sanctions against the violators of selfregulation rules properly and efficiently. In other words, they fail to secure actual influence on their members, so that it is doubtful that the co- regulation systems work efficiently.○The actors in the co- regulation systems show double- faced attitudes. For instance, the SROs and their members place strong emphasis on the importance of financial support by the government, while they express their dissatisfaction with the strong intervention of the government. On the contrary, the public officials contend that the SROs restrict their members` decision- making rights, while they insist on the necessity of the government`s intervention.III. Policy Recommendations□Establishment of a division of roles among public- private sectors in the context of the co- regulation systems○In the Korean case, strong government intervention in SROs runs a risk of resulting in their excessive reliance on the government, financially and operationally. It is, therefore, the proper and efficient○Since the SROs rely heavily on government, there are some concerns that they may belong to the government.○There are wide differences in mutual recognition and understanding between SROs and their members. The members of SROs have high level of complaints and dissatisfaction against the SROs in terms of validity of self- regulations (rules) and fairness in operating the systems.○The SROs cannot impose sanctions against the violators of selfregulation rules properly and efficiently. In other words, they fail to secure actual influence on their members, so that it is doubtful that the co- regulation systems work efficiently.○The actors in the co- regulation systems show double- faced attitudes. For instance, the SROs and their members place strong emphasis on the importance of financial support by the government, while they express their dissatisfaction with the strong intervention of the government. On the contrary, the public officials contend that the SROs restrict their members` decision- making rights, while they insiston the necessity of the government`s intervention.III. Policy Recommendations□Establishment of a division of roles among public- private sectors in the context of the co- regulation systems○In the Korean case, strong government intervention in SROs runs a risk of resulting in their excessive reliance on the government, financially and operationally. It is, therefore, the proper and efficient division of functions among the government and SROs that determines the success of co- regulation systems. It is desirable that the government frame and design the goals and general principles for regulation while the SROs elaborate the specific contents of the regulation and control implementation of the regulation○For efficient monitoring of SROs, it is necessary for the government to extend the evaluation rights for SROs, including the right for evaluation of operation and implementation of the self- regulation by the SRO, to apply strict standards for selection of competent SROs, and to strengthen SROs` capabilities.□Empowerment of SROs in co- regulation systems○To exercise the SROs` influence to their members, provide the SROs with institutional mechanisms to enforce on the membership in a relevant industry.○It is urgent that current multiple SROs in an industry unify to enhance their capabilities. In practice, dispersed SROs have caused various problems such as unclear responsibility through overlapping regulations, inconsistency and unfairness of regulations, and excessive burdens in relation to the regulated.□Sorting out the SROs and introducing a selective cooperation system○Sort out the SROs which have qualifications such as representativeness in a relevant industry and the capability to satisfy the internal responsibility and operate a co- regulation system efficiently.○For this purpose, set up specific and practical guidelines or standards to sort out qualified SROs. Based on the sorting mechanism, if possible, provide the SROs with differentiated missions and roles through a rating system of SROs.□Assuring the public roles and independence of SROs○To invigorate the co- regulation systems, settle down the problem caused by conflicting double roles which the SROs have intrinsically situated as both regulator and helpmate of their members in the context of co- regulation systems. If the SROs lean toward a role as helpers to their members, it is hard to expect them to promote the public interests that co- regulation systems are supposed to realize. On the contrary, if they commit themselves to the government`s orders or assignments, it will result in inefficiency by harming the SROs` independence.○To establish the self- regulatory mechanism (SROs) with independence and discretion to guarantee its effectiveness, form `the self- regulation committee` under the SRO, which would include experts, scholars, public officials, and representatives from citizen groups (for instance, consumer protection NGOs). In addition, provide the SROs with considerable power of personnel and finance to strengthen their influencing power.□Assuring the transparency in management of SROs○Transparency of SROs is one of the key factors to determine the success of the co- regulation systems. To tighten the transparency of SROs, make it compulsory to open the processes of enactment and revision of self- regulation, and the decision- making process of SROs.□Expanding participation of NGOs in co- regulation systems○To utilize citizen groups as mediators between government and SROs, make citizen groups participate in the `self- regulation policy committee` under the SROs.