경영자 지분율과 재무제표 비교가능성 간 관련성 = The relation between managerial ownership and financial statement comparability

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study examines the relation between managerial ownership and financial statement comparability.
Since market participants analyze and evaluate firms based on the financial statements, comparable financial statements could alleviate information asymmetry. However, the higher the agency cost of the firm, the more likely the manager is to report low quality of accounting information to pursue private interests, so that it could affect financial statement comparability.
We examine whether managerial ownership plays an important role in determining financial statement comparability. Managerial ownership is calculated using the sum of the number of owned shares that can be inquired in the “executives’ history and status of owned shares” in the TS2000 database of the Korea Listed Companies Association. Executives include the CEO, executive directors, managing directors, internal auditors, and advisors, etc. And financial statement comparability is estimated using the method as in De Franco et al. (2011).
Using 10,755 observations of KOSPI and KOSDAQ listed firms for the period 2011 to 2019, we find that higher managerial ownership is associated with greater financial statement comparability. We also provide evidence that positive association between CEO’s ownership and financial statement comparability. These results suggest that firms with high managerial ownership experience low level of agency problem and report more comparable financial statement. Also, these results can be interpreted as the manager’s ownership increases, the interests of shareholders and managers coincide, and it is expected that the manager would make decisions in the direction of maximizing the interests of shareholders as in Jensen and Meckling (1976).
We also examine several additional analyses. A significant positive relationship between managerial ownership and financial statement comparability is still remained when we use the method of Francis et al. (2014) to measure financial statement comparability. And in order to alleviate concerns about the possibility that the results of this paper may be caused by endogeneity, we use the first difference model and the time analysis model and results from both models show a significant positive relationship between managerial ownership and financial statement comparability. This study makes several c ontributions as follows. First, this study extends the literature by examining the association between managerial ownership and financial statement comparability. Second, our findings provide political implications for firms with low managerial ownership to enhance financial statement comparability. In particular, regulators may require appropriate internal control and monitoring through the board of directors and committees within the board of directors to prevent financial reporting behavior pursuing the private interests of the firm’s managers.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 논문은 경영자 지분율과 재무제표 비교가능성 간 관련성을 분석한다. 시장참여자들은 기업의 회계정보를 이용하여 기업을 분석 및 평가하므로, 재무제표 비교가능성을 제고하는 것은 기업의 내･외부의 정보비대칭을 완화하는 역할을 한다. 그러나 기업의 대리인 비용이 높을수록 경영자는 사적이익을추구하기 위해 기업의 이익을 투명하지 않게 보고할 가능성이 있으며, 재무제표 비교가능성에 영향을줄 수 있는 개연성이 존재한다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 대리인 비용, 구체적으로 경영자 지분율에 따라재무제표 비교가능성이 달라지는지 분석하였다. 2011년부터 2019년까지의 한국거래소 유가증권시장과 코스닥시장에 상장된 10,755개 표본을 이용하여 실증분석을 수행한 결과, 임원 지분율의 합과 재무제표 비교가능성 간 유의한 양(+)의 관련성이 나타났다. 또한 대표이사 지분율을 사용하는 경우에도동일한 결과를 보여주었다. 이러한 결과는 경영자 지분율이 높을수록, 대리인 비용이 감소하여 기업의이익을 비교적 투명하게 보고하여, 재무제표 비교가능성이 높아지는 것으로 해석할 수 있다. 본 논문의 공헌점은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 경영자 지분율과 재무제표 비교가능성의 관련성을 검증하여 선행연구를 확장하였다. 둘째, 분석결과를 바탕으로, 경영자 지분율이 낮은 기업에 대해 재무제표 비교가능성을 제고하기 위한 정책적 시사점을 제공할 것으로 기대된다.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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