KCI등재
동북아 지역질서의 재편 : 미·일·중 삼각관계와 한국의 안보외교 Trilateral Relationship among U.S., Japan and China and South Korea's Security Diplomacy = The Rearrangement of Northeast Asian Order
저자
이기종 (경희대 행정대학원)
발행기관
학술지명
권호사항
발행연도
1998
작성언어
Korean
KDC
390.000
등재정보
KCI등재
자료형태
학술저널
발행기관 URL
수록면
113-161(49쪽)
제공처
소장기관
The existing power arrangement in Northeast Asia can be characterized as one of confrontation between a new United States-Japanese alliance and China in the context of a strategic triangular relationship among the three countries, involving mutual conflict and cooperation. It is expected that, in the 21st century, there will emerge a pattern of confrontation between the United States and China, on the world level, and one between Japan and China, on the regional level. If a conflict between the United States and Japan should grow or if the former's armed forces stationed in East Asia should be cut down, there would reemerge the strategic triangular arrangement among the three major powers. In this case, each of the three countries would seek to gain Russia, which became relatively weekened, over to its side. Such an effort is already being made. Recently, China declares that it will proceed with a strategic partnership with Russia against the reinforcement of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Japan also tries to establish a new cooperative relationship with Russia in spite of a dispute over its four northern islands. In addition, the United States seeks to strengthen its relationship with Russia.
This paper examines triangular relationships among the United States, Japan, and China, and then North-South Korean relationships, as will be developed as the result of a reshuffle of power in East Asia. In the Cold War era, persistent confrontation existed between the three southern powers, including the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, and the three northern powers, such as the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. However, such a confrontation pattern has been attenuated by the following events: the end of the Cold War, the normalization of South Korean diplomatic relations with Russia and China in the early 1990s, and a U.S.- North Korean agreement on the nuclear issue in Geneva in October 1994. On the other hand, there has been some continuity in military relations. The U.S.-South Korean and Chinese-North Korean alliances have been maintained. After Russia abrogated its military alliance relationship with North Korea, it has pursued a balanced policy toward two Koreas.
This paper provides four scenarios of power arrangements which will develop in Northeast Asia in the 21st century. First is the case in which South Korea will maintain its alliance with the United States and its friendly relationships with China, Japan, and Russia. and in which it will continue its current confrontation with North Korea. This scenario is the best one from the South Korean perspective. In this case, Pyungyang will be isolated, and Seoul will seek to induce it to open and reform its system by means of pressure from the four neighboring major powers. As the second best one, another scenario is the case in which confrontation between the U.S.-South Korean alliance and North Korea will reemerge, and in which China, Japan, and Russia will take a neutral position. In this scenario, if South Korea, through its diplomatic efforts, reinforces its economic cooperation with China, and builds political and military confidence with the Baijing regime, it is highly likely .that the alliance relationship between North Korea and China will be abrogated as in the North Korean-Russian case. The third scenario is the worst one in which confrontation will develop between South Korea and the North Korean-Chinese alliance, but in which the United States, Russia, and Japan will adopt a neutralist or pro-North Korea policy. It is difficult to expect that this case will work. Nevertheless, it might happen if the U.S. forces in Korea should be withdrawn and if China should become a hegemonic power, while maintaining its alliance with North Korea. The last scenario is the case of direct confrontation between South and North Koreas. This case will take place when the four major powers make cross-recognition of two Koreas after North Korea's diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan.
As a theory of the North Korean regime's breakup has been recently raised, analysts assume that there would be a five-major power arrangement in which a unified Korea would function as a balancer in maintaining the balance of power in Northeast Asia. If Pyungyang successively soft-lands through the recovery of its economy and its diplomatic normalization with Washington and Tokyo, however, it is expected that there will emerge a six-power competitive arrangement. In this case, interactions between the United States, Japan, and China, on one hand, and two Koreas, on the other hand, will actively take place, while Russian influences will diminish.
This research provides several predictions about power relationships among the four major powers and in the Korean peninsular from short-, middle-, and long-term perspectives. From a short-term perspective, there exists a confrontation relationship between the U.S.-Japanese alliance and China on the regional level. It is predicted, on the level of the peninsular, that the U.S.-South Korean alliance and the South Korean-Japanese cooperative relationship will be maintained, along with the Chinese-North Korean alliance. From a middle-term perspective, the cross-recognition of two Koreas will weaken the U.S.-South Korean and Chinese-North Korean alliances. In this situation, the major powers as well as two Koreas will compete diplomatically with one another in order to establish a balance of power in Northeast Asia to their own advantage. From a long-term perspective, it can be assumed that change in the East Asia policy of the United States will lead to the weakening of its influence and, thus, the strengthening of the South Korean-Chinese relationship. At the same time, multilateral security cooperation would be institutionalized. In this case, South and North Koreas will vie not only with each other but also with the four major powers without regard to their existing alliance relationships.
After the normalization of the North Korean-U.S. diplomatic relationship, China will not remain indifferent to the situation in which the peninsular will fall under the exclusive influence of the United States. Nevertheless, Washington will seek to induce the two Koreas to pursue pro-American policies, After the cross-recognition of two Koreas, Japan will actively make such an effort to gain economic access to North Korea that it will have economic influence on the peninsular, unlike United States and Chinese efforts to exercise security influence. If the relationships among the three major powers and, especially those between the United States and China, should develop in the form of strategic cooperation, progress would be made in North-South Korean relations and, therefore, peace would be established in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, when the relationships between the United States and China become worsened or when those between Japan and China develop into hegemonic competition, both of two Koreas will adopt a policy of maintaining the status quo in the peninsular, while trying to create a balance of power to their advantage in the region. In the meantime, each of the major powers will pursue a policy of unifying the peninsular on the basis of its own superior power position.
The purposes of this paper is to predict the possible rearrangement of power relationships in the context of increasing insecurity in Northeast Asia and to examine South Korea's security measures. For these purposes, first of all, it describes the aspects of conflict and cooperation in the triangular relationships of the United States, Japan, and China, which resulted not only from the collapse of the Soviet Union but also from the subsequent weakening of Russian influence. It is predicted from a short-term perspective that those relationships will tend to be cooperative in their economic and security aspects. From a long-term perspective, however, they will show increasing conflict as the result of hegemonic competition, including emerging confrontation between the United States and China, around the year of 2020 when the latter's level of GNP becomes highest in the world.
Secondly, the research examines the trend of changes in power relationship and possible new arrangements in Northeast Asia. By doing so, it intends to provide South Korea's security measures. Since the existing arrangement of confrontation between the United States-Japanese alliance and China is expected to change into one of military and hegemonic competition between Japan and China, along with the diminution of American influence, South Korea and other Asian countries need to prepare for it.
Thirdly, the paper presents several models of power arrangements likely to develop around the Korean peninsular. In particular, it is predicted that, in the process of competition among the countries concerned after the cross-recognition of two Koreas, they and the four major powers will contend diplomatically with one another in order to gain more influence and security. Despite existing confrontation between the United States-South Korean alliance and Japanese-South Korean cooperative relationship, on one hand, and the Chinese-North Korean alliance, on the other hand, there is a likelihood that a new cooperative military relationship between South Korea and China will result from the reinforcement of their economic cooperation as well as from North Korea's diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan.
Finally, this research provides South Korea's security measures to meet the rearrangement of power relationship in Northeast Asia and its effects on the peninsular.
(1) Seoul should proceed with active security diplomacy designed to produce a balance of power in the region. In the 21st century, by attaining its goal of becoming an advanced nation, South Korea has to enter into a five-major power system. In this system, it should play the role of a balancer in maintaining peace and the balance of power by carrying out an active strategy of engagement. In addition, it not only should contain the North Korean threat through a Bismarck-policy of forming various alliances, but it also should build strong mechanisms for its security.
(2) Bilateral alliance relationships should be strengthened. Although the U.S.-South Korean alliance has recently loosened, it will be of greater strategic value in checking a Chinese threat in the case of deepening Sino-American confrontation in the 21st century. The South Korean-Japanese cooperative relationship has to be more extended in political. military, and cultural areas. The friendly relationship between Seoul and Baijing also should be extended on the basis of their economic cooperation so as to pave the way for the unification of the peninsular.
(3) A system of multilateral security cooperation should be created in the Northeast Asia. Although there has been no tradition of security dialogues and confidence among the major powers, the South Korean government has to play a leading role in establishing such a system as an institutional mechanism for the peace and security of the peninsular. Because South Korea, in comparision with the major powers, has limited military capabilities to guarantee its security, it should depend upon preventive diplomacy through multilateral security cooperation in the case of a crisis in the peninsular or territorial and maritime disputes in the region.
(4) Certain measures should be taken to reinforce South Korean armed forces in the direction of attaining self-reliant national defense. Based on a self-sufficient defense strategy, the armed forces have to be capable of defending against any probable external invasions. In preparation for the existing North Korean threat as well as for any expansionist moves resulting from Sino-American hegemonic competion and the military buildups of China and Japan, South Korea should strengthen its naval forces and accelerate the modernization of military equipments and weapons. The above-mentioned measures are necessary for maintaining peace and security in Northeast Asia and the peninsular. Moreover. they will provide a basis for Korean unification.
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