Korea-US Alliance and Emergence of China as a Regional Power : 韓美同盟과 地域强大國으로서의 中國의 登場

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The alliance between the US and Korea has come a long way since it was first officially signed some 50 years ago. Faced with multiple challenges from varying directions, it now stands at a crossroads. It must prove its utility in today’s changed circumstances if it is to continue. The end of the Cold War has drastically reduced superpower competition in the region. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the remaining regional powers, particularly China and Japan, appear apt to increasingly affect the balance of power of the region. The simplicity of the Cold War system, where lines of demarcations between enemies and friends were clearly drawn, has been replaced by a complex system where no country is exactly sure of who their ‘true friends’ are. In this changed situation, different nations are trying to protect and promote their national interests in different ways. Three nuclear powers, namely, the U.S., Russia and China, and one economic super-power, Japan, are all contending for influence in the region. There are also considerable worries regarding China's continued pursuit of military modernization, North Korea's drive to become an indigenous nuclear power, and possibly Japan's resort to autonomous militarization.
Today the principle axis of rivalry has changed from that of the United States-Soviet Union to the United States-China. To present a formidable deterrent to any emerging challenge to its position of influence in the region, the U.S. maintains alliances with the ROK and Japan. However, China is not happy with the prevailing order in the region and is seeking a new, regional order. To this end, it is carefully nurturing its "strategic partnership" with Russia and consults regularly with its long-time ally, North Korea. It is also seeking out new friends like South Korea by developing sound economic relationships with that country. In this changing regional environment, the competition between the U.S. and China is sharpening, and bilateral relationships are forming the centerpieces of any strategy to maintain a regional and global balance of power.
In this context a debate is raging throughout the region over whether China's economic rise is a factor of stability or instability in the region. Regardless of China’s best efforts to project its economic growth as an opportunity for all Asian countries to grow along with it and prosper, many countries in the region are not sure of the possible consequences of China’s rise as an economic and military power. Many of its neighbors sense that China's growing strength will cause traumatic shifts in the balance of power in the region. A stronger China will undercut the pre-eminence of Japan, challenge America's role as regional overseer, rewrite Southeast Asia's economic and political course, and influence the peace process on the Korean peninsula in such a way that will undermine the interest of the other regional powers. The growing economic and military power of China has led it to view the region from different perspectives. It now contests with the US on many issues concerning peace and stability in the region. It is asking for a new regional order based on five principles of peaceful co-existence and wants to see the end of American dominance in the region.
The U.S. and China also have differing visions over the Korean peninsula. The U.S. argues that future security is best served by a continued U.S.-Korea security relationship even after reunification or reconciliation. On the contrary, China disagrees that maintaining a U.S. security alliance is the best way of achieving peace and stability in the region. China argues that it is premature to envision post-reunification alignments in the region at this stage. Both countries also disagree on many issues concerning the region such as arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. China does not want to enter into comprehensive arms talks with America, as it continues to expand its own nuclear and missile arsenals. However, it is dead-set against U.S. efforts to pursue theater missile defense (especially if it involves Taiwan) and national missile defense programs. Rather, it wants the US to cut short its missile defense plans immediately. It also does not view US arms sale in the region favorably and wants this aspect included as part of any agenda of arms controls discussions in the region.
The North Korean nuclear program is another important issue dominating the region. It is the core issue of contention between the US and North Korea. North Korea is not willing to give up its nuclear program until and unless fully compensated both politically and economically. While negotiations and six-party talks are currently going on, North Korea progresses constantly on its nuclear program. It is believed today that North Korea is much closer to nuclear weapons than it was just five years ago. A recent report of the CIA suggested North Korea might possess up to eight nuclear weapons.
South Korea has changed its hard-line stance on North Korea and has adopted a much softer approach towards its northern neighbor. It is in favor of solving the nuclear crisis through peaceful means and is against war with North Korea on the issue. This new approach of the South Korean government is creating a lot of friction between US-South Korea relations. America has gone from a softer to a more uncompromising position, and it wants North Korea to abandon its nuclear program unconditionally before any talks can be held on other issues facing the region.
Moreover, the US is refusing to negotiate the problem with North Korea bilaterally and is insisting on a multilateral approach. However, it has increased the leverage of China in the six-party talks over North Korea’s peace process. China is the only country in the region which has close relations with North Korea, and it is in a better position to restrain North Korea than it was just ten years ago. Today, 70 to 82 percent of North Korea’s energy needs and 40- 50 percent of its supply needs are met by China. How China plays out its role in the peace process and in North Korean’s nuclear and missile questions and what kind of influence it manages to have over North Korea and South Korea in solving the crisis will play a major role in determining China ‘s new position in the emerging new regional order of North East Asia.
North Korea‘s closer relationship with China has provided it with much-needed psychological and material support. The security guarantee that Beijing has assured is an incalculable asset for the embattled and isolated regime. To its credit, China has attempted to nudge Pyongyang toward reforms. However, the extent to which it has succeeded in opening North Korea’s closed economic system remains unclear.
Lately, South Korea has shown considerable appreciation for closer North Korea-China relations, and it expects China to be a positive force in continuing to improve inter-Korean relations. At the same time, however, it should have no illusions about Chinese motives. China has no desire to see a unified Korea that would eliminate an ally and a buffer state on its border. Neither does China (like any other country in the region) want to see North Korea implode or self-destruct. The ROK government should well understand that what Beijing wants are good relations with South Korea to promote trade and investment and the transfer of technology and other forms of know-how. Yet recent Chinese attempts to play hard-ball with the ROK over various trade disputes were a pointed reminder of the limits of Beijing's good will.
On the Korean peninsula the growing Korea-China business relations are challenging the traditional US-Korea alliance. China surpassed the United States as the primary destination for Korean investment in 2002. According to the Korea Investment Trade Association, Korea’s trade relations with China (Hong Kong included) reached US$74 billion as of 2003. Korea has relied on its alliance with the United States as a hedge against military threats from the North. At the same time it has cultivated different partners -- including some the United States identifies as present or potential security threats -- to hedge against economic dangers. Of course, using the U.S. alliance as a military shield and other economic relationships as a mercantile sword has not been easy, and it has required some delicate diplomacy from Korea to harmonize the seemingly contradictory aspects of its strategy. Specifically, Korea has had to reassure Washington that it is acting as an active military partner, while at the same time reassuring other capitals that it is not.
While the rapid and steady development of Sino-Korea trade cannot be considered outside of the global economic environment, it can be safely argued that internal factors between the two nations have played a more important role. Even though the geographical proximity and similar cultural backgrounds have played crucial roles for Sino-Korea economic cooperation and development by cutting the costs of transportation and trade, these are basically secondary factors. More important are both nations’ new strategic thinking and the perceived relative importance of each other in meeting their respective national interests.
Increasing economic ties with China has put South Korea at a crossroads. It is being called upon to make some crucial strategic choices. The most important question before South Korea is what kind of overall relationship it should have with China. It has to decide to what extent it can cultivate this new partnership with China without affecting the balance of power in the region and its half-century old alliance with the US.
China is also trying to walk a fine line in balancing its bilateral relations with Seoul and Pyongyang. It fully understands that in order to keep its influence on the peninsula it must maintain good relations with both countries. In this context it has been trying to play the role of facilitator in north-south relations. China is also acting as a moderating influence over North Korea's behavior.
It must be admitted that China's rising share in Korea's economic relations and the cultural similarities the two nations share will inevitably influence Korea‘s military alliance with the United States to some extent. Korean security specialists with a focus on China recognize that the rise of China is "the most serious security dilemma that the ROK will face in the mid- to long-term." When confronted with the contradictions inherent in balancing Korea's rapidly developing economic interests on the one hand with the requirements of the U.S.-ROK security alliance on the other, some Korean analysts argue that the Cold War is over and it is no longer necessary to view political, security, and economic relationships in zero-sum terms. Korean analysts examine the level of economic interdependence between the U.S. and China and conclude that the nature of the U.S. relationship with China is different from that with the former Soviet Union, arguing that the possibility of a "partnership-like relationship" between the U.S. and China should not be excluded in the future. Given the stakes involved, many Korean analysts appear to be in denial regarding a potential Sino-U.S. confrontation, and the ROK government "has taken no concrete steps in planning on these issues."
Many South Koreans favor strategies that avoid escalation of U.S.-China disputes and emphasize cooperative relationships between Washington and Beijing. Given the intermittently confrontational track of the U.S.-PRC relationship, the issue of how to deal with China is gradually becoming a likely source of future differences in the U.S.-ROK relationship. It is important for diplomatic consultations and coordination on policies toward the PRC to be enhanced as a vehicle for minimizing alliance differences and building support within the alliance relationship. Despite Korea's growing trade with China, Seoul knows that the foundation for a prosperous trade relationship with China is its security relationship with the United States and under current circumstances will have to choose the security relationship when pressed to do so. The ROK's continued liberalization and a strong U.S. economic presence - as market for Korean goods, as investor in the Korean market, and as guarantor of regional economic and security stability - will increasingly become an essential underpinning to ensure that Korea's orientation and feelings of shared values remain strongly with the U.S., despite Korea's cultural affinity for China.
One reason that the US-Korea alliance has survived for the last 50 years is that it serves the interests of both Korea and the US well. On the Korean side, it serves in countering the North Korean threat, containing North Korea's nuclear program, helping in the peace process and preventing the emergence of a regional superpower. It also helps the Koreans in attaining sufficient national self-defense capabilities, in preventing regional crises, in achieving weapons system compatibility with allies, in protection of sea lanes and overseas assets, and in maintaining a competitive defense industry.
On the US side, the alliance helps in countering the North Korean threat, maintaining influence within the Asian Pacific region, preventing the emergence of a regional superpower and maintaining economic ties and creating and developing markets in the Asian Pacific region. It also serves the US in spreading democracy and free market economics, preventing regional crises and the emergence of possible enemy states, attaining an allied weapon sales market, protection of sea lanes and overseas assets, and defense budget savings through contributions of allied nations.
The presence of American forces would also be a deterring factor to neighboring countries that might try to exploit the unstable situation for their own interests. In the absence of Korea‘s alliance with the U.S., keeping healthy relations with Japan would also pose a challenging problem. It could make the Koreans more nervous in dealing with Japan outside of the American alliance system. The Japanese would also be suspicious of a Korea detached from their American alliance partner, as a unified Korea in the absence of American forces could fall into Chinese orbit easily. This in turn could lead to tensions between Japan?Korea and Japan-China. Japan, which is expected to play the most prominent role in the rebuilding of a unified Korea, might not be coming forward with major economic assistance in a scenario whereby Korea were to tilt substantially towards China. The U.S. military presence in Korea would thus be a crucial factor in Japan’s post-unification assistance to Korea.
The U.S. has no history of invading Korea for territorial gains and thus can be more trusted by the Korean people than any other country in the eastern region. This leaves America relatively free of Korean suspicion as a potential foe. And its role as balancer in the region would be least opposed not only by the Koreans themselves but also by the countries surrounding the Korean peninsula.
Keeping in view the interests the US-Korea alliance serves for both countries, it will be big mistake for Korea to sacrifice the benefits of its special security relationship with America for that of a closer relationship with China. China is and will remain a strategic uncertainty for Korea, given its enormous population, proximity and history of seeking dominant influence over the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the nature of China's communist political system should also limit the trust and appreciation Korea's populace has for Chinese politics and ambition.
In many regards China is no match for the U.S. It will have many economic, political, and social hurdles to cross before it can even legitimately challenge American leadership in the region. It has very few allies outside of close relations with a handful of outcast autocratic states such as Myanmar, North Korea and Pakistan, who carry little weight in the international arena. Its position is further weakened by its obsession with issues of “sovereignty,” which makes it difficult for Beijing to participate actively in diplomatic intercourse and multinational institutions that are based on give-and-take among nations. In several cases, such as the South China Sea Islands and Taiwan, it has shown a preference for the use of force or the threat thereof over diplomacy. The Chinese tendency of hurling verbal abuse at foreign governments with which it disagrees further limits the effectiveness of its diplomacy. Its handling of the US Navy EP-3 incident earlier in 2001 exemplified its tendency to overact and in the process, to strengthen anti-PRC sentiment overseas.
From 1978 through to the mid-1990s, China had the fastest-growing economy in the world, and it has appeared poised to dominate Asia, and beyond, in the near future. But after focusing on facts rather than theory and looking at the conditions behind the spectacular numbers, many scholars have begun to doubt China‘s mid- to long-term economic future. As one scholar recently observed, "peer beneath the surface, and there is a weak China, one that is in long-term decline and even on the verge of collapse. The symptoms of decay are to be seen everywhere." By failing to complete its reformation, China has maintained an illusion of progress, but in reality has caused more problems than opportunities for would-be entrepreneurs and foreign investors. Because reform has not been fast enough or sufficiently comprehensive, China is unable to benefit from its modernization or keep up technologically with much of the world. The government's reluctance to get rid of state-owned enterprises has not only rendered China uncompetitive just as it has begun its membership in the World Trade Organization, but this reluctance is causing the banks--which were forced to lend money to SOEs--to fail alongside them. Widespread unemployment, corruption within the Communist party, millions of resentful peasants, and a general lack of leadership further threaten stability. The Communist party "knows how to suppress but it no longer has the power to lead”.
Despite having the largest army in the world, China is also militarily weak. Its forces have no resources even remotely comparable with its American counterparts. In any armed clash between the U.S. and China, the latter would have remote chances of gaining any sort of military victory. Some have argued that while China is obviously no comparison to the U.S. in this regard, it does have the potential to grow and challenge American regional might in the future. This view is partially wrong, however. Though China does have a great potential of growth and may enjoy increasing economic prosperity, it has no chances of coming close to what the Americans have and are enjoying today. There are many reasons for this. Foremost, China lacks the rule of law and solid property rights that are the foundations of all developed states, be they western or Asian. Empirical evidence shows us that it is extremely difficult and time-consuming to develop the institutions that serve as the backbone of economically developed polities. Moreover, the gradual decaying of the Communist party, which has not been accompanied by the development of alternative political organizations, points to a coming period of instability rather than continued growth. China can thus in no way compare to or replace the U.S. as a dominant economic or military force in the region. Thus Korea does not have much choice but to keep its alliance with the US for its very survival as rich and prosperous nation in the region.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• Acknowledgements = I
• CHAPTER 1 Introduction = 1
• I. Introducing the Study = 1
• II. Purpose of the Study = 3
• III. Literature Review = 6
• IV. Theoretical Framework = 8
• V. Organization of the Study = 22
• CHAPTER 2 Emerging New Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific = 24
• I. Rise of the Dragon = 24
• II. Development of Military Power = 26
• III. China’s Security Policy in Northeast Asia = 32
• IV. Japan’s Altered Proactive Security Stance = 37
• V. Security Challenges and Options in Northeast Asia = 43
• CHAPTER 3 China and South Korea: From Enemies to Friends = 49
• I. China’s New Diplomatic Initiative = 49
• II. China‘s Rise Over Korea = 52
• III. Political and Diplomatic Developments between Korea and China = 58
• IV. Factors in Sino-Korean Relations = 62
• V. To be or not to be: Korea at a Crossroads = 70
• CHAPTER 4 China and North Korea: New Face to the Old Alliance = 79
• I. From a Fellow Comrade to Just a Friend = 79
• II. Walking the Fine Line: Keeping an Old Friend and Making a New Partner = 82
• III. Still Going Strong: Against all Odds = 87
• IV. Decline of North Korea and Shift in China‘s Strategic Policy = 90
• V. Problems in the Alliance = 94
• VI. Future of the China - North Korea Relationship = 101
• CHAPTER 5 China and the US in East Asia: Replacing the Old Hegemon = 105
• I. Demanding New Order in East Asia = 105
• II. Backbone of China’s Demand of New Order in the Asia - Pacific = 110
• III. The China Question in the US‘s Asia Strategy = 115
• IV. Potentials and Constraints for Strategic Relations Between China and the US = 123
• CHAPTER 6 China and the Future of the US - Korea Alliance = 134
• I. China and the US on the Korean Peninsula = 134
• II. The Changing Position of the US on the Korean Peninsula = 144
• III. U.S.-Korea Alliance Under Stress = 148
• IV. Factors Responsible for the Drift in the Alliance = 151
• V. Importance of the US - Korea Alliance for the Security of the Peninsula = 154
• VI. Continuing the Alliance = 158
• CHAPTER 7 Conclusion = 164
• Bibliography = 172