Major crises in contemporary American foreign policy : a documentary history

목차 (Table of Contents)

• contents
• Series Foreword = xxxix
• Introduction = xli
• PART Ⅰ : Soviet-American Relations and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1947 = 1
• CHRONOLOGY = 2
• AGREEMENTS AND PERSONALITIES AT YALTA = 4
• Document 1 : The Yalta Conference Protocol and Agreements (February 1945) = 4
• Document 2 : Soviet Diplomat Andrei Gromyko Recalls the Stalin-Roosevelt Meeting at Yalta, and the Issue of Soviet Forces in the Pacific (February 1945) = 6
• Document 3 : Soviet "Spymaster" Compares Soviet Geopolitical Gains from the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact with Salin's Expansionist Motives at Yalta (Spring 1945) = 7
• REPATRIATION AND POLAND = 8
• Document 4 : Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall's Instructions to General John Deane to Investigate the Treatment of American Servicemen Behind Russian Lines (3 March 1945) = 8
• Document 5 : American Ambassador to the Soviet Union Cables State Department that Soviets Using U.S. Servicemen "as a Club" in Negotiations (14 March 1945) = 9
• Document 6 : President Franklin Roosevelt's Letter to Josef Stalin on Evacuation and Treatment of Liberated U.S. Servicemen in Eastern Europe (17 March 1945) = 11
• Document 7 : Stalin's Reply to President Roosevelt's Cable [Document 6] on the Evacuation of American POWs from Liberated Eastern Europe (22 March 1945) = 11
• Document 8 : Ambassador Harriman Reports the Unsatisfactory Conditions for Liberated American Servicemen in Soviet Camps (24 March 1945) = 12
• Document 9 : President Harry Truman Meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in Washington (22-23 April 1945) = 12
• ATOMIC DIPLOMACY AND POTSDAM = 15
• Document 10 : Winston Churchill to Secretary of War Henry Stimson on "Tube Alloys" (18 July 1945) = 16
• Document 11 : Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov Recalls the Soviets' Atomic Program and the Role of American Scientists Julius and Ethel Rosenberg (1943-1953) = 16
• Document 12 : Secretary of War Stimson's Memo to President Truman on the Effect of the U.S. Atomic Bomb in Relations with Russia (11 September 1945) = 17
• Document 13 : Ambassador Gromyko Recalls How President Truman Notified Stalin that America Was Preparing to Use the Atomic Bomb Against Japan (24 July 1945) = 18
• Document 14 : The Potsdam Conference's Protocol of Proceedings (1 August 1945) = 20
• Document 15 : Soviet General Recounts Stalin's Cancellation of Soviet Landing on the Japanese Island of Hokkaido (August 1945) = 21
• Document 16 : Soviet Intelligence Officer Reveals that an American Scientist Informed Soviets of America's Inability to Conduct a Nuclear War Against the USSR (Late 1940s) = 21
• THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS : TRIPOLITANIA, JAPAN, AND IRAN = 22
• Document 17 : Secretary of State James Byrnes Remembers the Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting in London (September 1945) = 22
• Document 18 : Secretary Byrnes Recalls Ambassador Harriman's Report of Stalin's keen Interest in the Allied Occupation of Japan (November 1945) = 23
• Document 19 : Secretary Byrnes at the Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting in Moscow and His Discussion with Stalin about Iran (December 1945) = 24
• Document 20 : Stalin's Speech that the Western Powers Initially Assessed as "The Declaration of World War Ⅲ" (9 February 1946) = 26
• THE LONG TELEGRAM. THE IRON CURTAIN SPEECH, AND THE CLIFFORD REPORT = 27
• Document 21 : East-West Tension Ascribed to Kremlin's Ideological Conception of Inevitability of Conflict Between Communist-Capitalist Camps (Jund 1946) = 27
• Document 22 : Charg$$e'$$ George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram" (22 February 1946) = 29
• Document 23 : Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" Speech (5 March 1946) = 34
• Document 24 : the "Monumental Top-Secret" Clifford-Elsey Report Prepared for President Truman (24 September 1946) = 36
• THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT = 40
• Document 25 : President Truman Reveals Plat to Aid Greece and Turkey as Crucial Element of His Doctrine to Contain Communist Expansion (12 March 1947) = 41
• Document 26 : National Security Act of 1947 The NSC, the CIA, the JCS, and the National Military Establishment (26 July 1947) = 44
• THE MARSHALL PLAN AND COMINFORM = 47
• Document 27 : American Diplomat George Kennan Explains the Functions of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and Its Recommendations to Secretary of State George
• Marshall of Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of Europe (24 May 1947) = 47
• Document 28 : Soviet General Stresses that COMINGFORM Was Stalin's Response to Truman's Doctrine of Containment (September 1947) = 48
• PART Ⅱ : The Berlin blockade and Airlift, 1948-1949 = 51
• CHRONOLOGY = 52
• THE ALLIES' GERMANY AND BERLIN DILEMMA = 53
• Document 29 : Lancaster House Protocol on the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of "Greater Berlin" (12 September 1944) = 53
• Document 30 : Protocol on Germany at the Yalta Conference (February 1945) = 55
• Document 31 : U.S. General Lucius Clay and Soviet General Georgi Zhukov Discuss Lines of Communication Between Germany and Berlin (29 June 1945) = 55
• Document 32 : The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference Protocol (2 August 1945) = 56
• Document 33 : General Clay Recalls the Allied Control Council's Decision to Approve Air Corridors to and from Berlin (30 November 1945) = 57
• Document 34 : Secretary of State James Byrnes' Speech at Stuttgart Concerning U.S. Relations with Postwar Germany (6 September 1946) = 58
• Document 35 : The London Conference Communiqu$$e'$$ on Germeny (7 June 1948) = 61
• Document 36 : Soviet Intelligence Officer Pavel Sudoplatov Asserts that Stalin Initiated the Crisis to Assure Comunist Victory in China (1994) = 63
• OPERATION VITTLES = 64
• Document 37 : General Clay's Cable to Army General Omar Bradley (1 Aprin 1948) = 64
• Document 38 : Teleconference Between General Clay, Army Secretary Royall, and Army Chief of Staff General Bradley over Evacuation from Berlin (2 April 1948)= 65
• Document 39 : General Clay Orders Airlift Phase of Operation Vittles (June 1948) = 67
• Document 40 : The Importance of Transatlantic Teleconference Communication, and General Clay's Request to Upgrade the Airlift with C-54s (July 1948) = 68
• Document 41 : General Bradley Remembers the Airlift as the Cold War's "Single Greatest Triumph" (1983) = 69
• Document 42 : Secretary of Defense James Forrestal's Diary with Comments on the Blockade, B-29s to Britain, and the Atomic Bomb (Jund-July 1948) = 69
• Document 43 : Secretary Forrestal to Secretary of State Marshall on U.S. Preparation for Global Conflict (28 July 1948) = 72
• Document 44 : U.S. Diplomatic Note to the Soviet Government (6 July 1948) = 73
• Document 45 : Note from the Soviet Union to the United States (14 July 1948) = 74
• Document 46 : Secretary Marshall to U.S. Ambassador Lewis Douglas on the Allied Approach Toward Stalin (20 July 1948) = 76
• Document 47 : Foreign Ministers' Communiqu$$e'$$ Refers the Crisis to the UN Security Council (26 September 1948) = 79
• Document 48 : Dean Acheson on the State Department's Reaction to Stalin's Interview with Kingsbury Smith (February 1949) = 79
• Document 49 : Ambassador Phillip Jessup's "Park Avenue Diplomacy-Ending the Berlin Blosckade" (March-May 1949) = 81
• Document 50 : Communiqu$$e'$$ of Agreement on Berlin from the French, British, and United States Representatives to the United Nations (4 May 1949) = 84
• PART Ⅲ : The Korean War, 1950-1953 = 87
• CHRONOLOGY = 89
• PRIOR TO 25 JUNE 1950 = 90
• Document 51 : The Cairo Declaration by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Jiang (1 December 1943) = 90
• Document 52 : Dean Rusk Recalls How "Two Tired Colonels" Divided Korea at the 38th Parallel (14 August 1945) = 91
• Document 53 : As Commander of U.S Forces in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur Recommends to the War Department that Both American and Russian Forces Be Withdrawn from Korea (16 December 1945) = 92
• Document 54 : U.S. Notification to Soviets of Intent to Refer the Korean Question to the UN (7 September 1947) = 94
• Document 55 : Joint Chiefs of Staff's Assessment of America's National Interest in Korea (September 1947) = 94
• Document 56 : Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Reports to Stalin of Kim Il-Sung's Increasing Preparations to Attack South Korea (19 January 1950) = 95
• Document 57 : Secretary of State Dean Acheson's "Defensive Perimeter of the Pacific" Speech During a Meeting of the U.S. Press Club (12 January 1950) = 97
• Document 58 : Acheson Recalls His Speech and the Defeat of an Aid Package (1950) = 98
• Document 59 : National Security Council Paper #68 (25 April 1950) = 99
• THE 38TH PARALLEL = 101
• Document 60 : President Truman Responds to the North Korean Attack (25 June 1950) = 101
• Document 61 : President Truman's Military Response to Attack (27 June 1950) = 103
• Document 62 : President Truman on Military Action in Korea (30 June 1950) = 103
• Document 63 : American Diplomat George Kennan Recalls Discussions at the State Department to Restore 38th Parallels as the Status Quo Ante (June-July 1950) = 104
• Document 64 : Internal State Department Memorandum Outlining U.S. Policy Concerning the 38th Parallel (1 July 1950) = 105
• Document 65 : John Foster Dulles' 38th Parallel Memorandum (14 July 1950) = 105
• Document 66 : Secretary of Defense George Marshall to General MacArthur to Cross the 38th Parallel (29 September 1950) = 107
• Document 67 : General MacArthur's Rationale for Amphibious Landing at Inchon (23 August 1950) = 107
• TRUMAN-MACARTHUR CONTROVERSY = 108
• Document 68 : General MacArthur's Proposed Message to the Chicago Convention of Veterans of Foreign Wars (28 August 1950) = 108
• Document 69 : Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and President Truman's Responses to MacArthur's VFW Message (August 1950) = 110
• Document 70 : President Truman Recalls Policy Differences with General MacArthur (August 1950) = 110
• Document 71 : President Truman's Meeting at Wake Island with General MacArthur (October 1950) = 111
• Document 72 : General MacArthur Remembers Wake Island Meeting with President Truman (October 1950) = 112
• Document 73 : General MacArthur's "My Authority as Field Commander" Statement (24 March 1951) = 113
• Document 74 : Joint Chiefs of Staff Message to General MacArthur (24 March 1951) = 114
• Document 75 : The Open Letters Between Minority Leader Congressman Joseph Martin and General MacArthur discussion U.S. Policy in Asia and Europe (March 1951) = 114
• Document 76 : President Truman's Dismissal of General MacArthur (April 1951) = 115
• Document 77 : President Truman Replaces General MacArthur (10 April 1951) = 117
• COMBAT AND ESPIONAGE = 118
• Document 78 : Indian Diplomat K. M. Panikkar Warns Western Governments from Post in Beijing of Impending Intervention in Korea by Communist China (October 1950) = 118
• Document 79 : Commander of Chinese Forces in Korea, Marshal Peng Dehuai, Describes His Strategy of Protracted War Against the United States (1950-1951) = 119
• Document 80 : Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley Recalls Critical Decisions (November 1950) = 120
• Document 81 : An American Soldier's Letter from the Front to His Family Back Home (2 December 1950) = 120
• Document 82 : State Department Memorandum Chronicles Dean Rusk's Position that U.S. Make an Effective Stand in Korea (4 December 1950) = 121
• Document 83 : State Department Minutes of President Truman-British Prime Minister Clement Attlee Meeting to Discuss Allied Interests in Asia (December 1950) = 121
• Document 84 : General Matthew Ridgway Assumes Command of U.S. 8th Army in Korea (26 December 1950) = 123
• Document 85 : Britain's Kim Philby and Soviet Espionage During the War (Autumn 1950) = 123
• Document 86 : UN General Assembly Resolution Declaring Communist China an Aggressor (1 February 1951) = 124
• Document 87 : CIA Estimate on Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Korea (6 August 1951) = 125
• EISENHOWER-DULLES PLAN = 126
• Document 88 : John Foster Dulles to President-Elect Eisenhower on POWs, and the Advantages the Soviets Derive from the Korean War (26 November 1952) = 127
• Document 89 : President-elect Dwight Eisenhower Visits Korea and Meets with South Korean President Syngman Rhee (December 1952) = 128
• Document 90 : President Eisenhower's Plan to End the War with Atomic Weapons (January 1953) = 129
• Document 91 : President Eisenhower's Correspondence with South Korea's President Rhee (April 1953) = 130
• PRISONER OF WAR AND REPATRIATION DILEMMA = 131
• Document 92 : Kim Il-Sung Proposal on Repatriation of Prisoners (February 1953) = 131
• Document 93 : Dulles and Eisenhower Discuss Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai's Cablegram on Role of Neutral States in Repatriation (30 March 1953) = 132
• Document 94 : State Department Memo Notes U.S. Reaction to Zhou En-lai's Proposal for Repatriation (30 March 1953) = 132
• Document 95 : National Security Council's James Lay Notes the Relationship of POW Issues to Armistice Negotiations (2 April 1953) = 133
• Document 96 : American Diplomat Charles Bohlen Helps Draft State Department Formula Toward Prisoners-of-War Issues (1952-1953) = 134
• Document 97 : Prisoners of War and the U.S. Military Code of Conduct (1980) = 135
• ASSESSING THE USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN KOREA = 136
• Document 98 : Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru Fears U.S. Will Use Atomic Bomb Only Against Asiatics (3 December 1950) = 136
• Document 99 : National Security Council Discusses Use of Atomic Weapons (11 February 1953) = 137
• Document 100 : Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department Meeting on the Use of Atomic Weapons (27 March 1953) = 138
• Document 101 : President Eisenhower Weighs the Options of Using Atomic Weapons in Korea (31 March 1953) = 139
• Document 102 : NSC Policy Statement on the Advantages and Disadvantages of Using Atomic Weapons in Korea (2 April 1953) = 140
• CONSEQUENCES OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT = 142
• Document 103 : Prominent Diplomat Charles Bohlen Sees the Korean War as Juncture Where the U.S. Becomes a World Power (1973) = 142
• Document 104 : General Bradley's Assessment as to Why the Korean War Ended (March 1953) = 143
• PART Ⅳ : The Berlin Crisis of 1958-1959 and 1961 = 145
• CHRONOLOGY = 146
• The Berlin Crisis of 1958-1959 = 148
• KHRUSHCHEV MANEUVERS FOR GDR DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION = 148
• Document 105 : U.S. Embassy-Bonn Requests Policy Plan Regarding Western Access to Berlin and Authority of German Democratic Republic (GDR) (January 1958) = 148
• Document 106 : Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki's Plan for Denuclearization of Central Europe (February 1958) = 149
• Document 107 : President Eisenhower's Diary on Not Being "Too Stiffnecked" about U.S. Recognition of German Democratic Republic (9 June 1958) = 150
• Document 108 : Chairman Khrushchev's "Ultimatum" Directing the Western Powers to Deal Directly with the GDR on Any Quetions Concerning Berlin (10 November 1958) = 150
• Document 109 : President Eisenhower Recalls the Physical and Psychological Symbolism of Berlin to Both Western Allies and Soviet Bloc (10 November 1958) = 151
• Document 110 : Nikita Khrushchev Remembers the Berlin Crisis of 1958-1959 (1974) = 152
• Document 111 : U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson Speculates from Moscow on Motives for Khrushchev's Ultimatum (11 November 1958) = 153
• Document 112 : American Diplomatic-Military Mission in Berlin Analyzes Khrushchev's Ultimatum (12 November 1958) = 154
• Document 113 : State Department Circular to Diplomatic Missions (13 November 1958) = 154
• Document 114 : Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter Reports to President Eisenhower Concerning Increased Tension over the Status of Berlin (13 November 1958) = 155
• EISENHOWER-DULLES IN RESPONSE = 156
• Document 115 : President Eisenhower Recalls the Military and Diplomatic Options (20 November 1958) = 156
• Document 116 : President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles Compare Tension over Berlin with Quemoy Crises of 1954 and 1958 with Communist China (18 November 1958) = 157
• Document 117 : West German Chancellor's Letter to Secretary Dulles (20 November 1958) = 157
• Document 118 : U.S. Diplomatic and Pentagon Leaders Discuss Berlin (21 November 1958) = 158
• Document 119 : Secretary Dulles' Controversial Press Conference (26 November 1958) = 159
• Document 120 : U.S. Ambassador David Bruce Reports West German Reaction to Dulles' Remarks (26 November 1958) = 161
• Document 121 : Soviet Diplomatic Note to the United States (27 November 1958) = 161
• Document 122 : President Eisenhower's Perception that Khrushchev's Berlin Gambit Was an "Ultimatum" and "Showdown" to Divide the West (27 November 1958) = 163
• Document 123 : Khrushchev Describes Berlin as "a Bone in His Throat" (3 December 1958) = 164
• Document 124 : U.S. Embassy in Moscow Reports that Premier Khrushchev Worried over Intellectuals and Professionals Fleeing from Eastern Bloc (5 December 1958) = 165
• Document 125 : State Department Memo Expresses Concern that Premier Khrushchev May Lack Any Domestic Option for Flexibility over Berlin (8 December 1958) = 166
• Document 126 : Former High Commissioner for Germany John McCloy Advises the State Department on Berlin Situation (10 December 1958) = 167
• Document 127 : Ambassador Bruce's Diary on Use of Threats (10 December 1958) = 168
• Document 128 : President Eisenhower's National Security Meeting (11 December 1958) = 168
• Document 129 : Foreign Ministers' Communicqu$$e'$$ Reaffirms Quadripartite Responsibilities in Berlin (Paris, 14 December 1958) = 169
• Document 130 : North Atlantic Council Deniesthe USSR's Right to Unilaterally Renounce Responsibility for Free Access to Berlin (Paris, 16 December 1958) = 170
• Document 131 : President Eisenhower Recalls Drafting the American Response to Soviets' 27 November Note (11-31 December 1958) = 171
• Document 132 : U.S. Diplomatic Note to USSR on Status of Berlin (31 December 1958) = 172
• Document 133 : Excerpt from President Eisenhower's State of the Union Address (9 January 1959) = 173
• Document 134 : President Eisenhower's Conference with His Advisers (29 January 1959) = 173
• Document 135 : American Note Accepting Soviet Proposal for a Foreign Ministers Meeting on Germany-Berlin (16 February 1959) = 175
• Document 136 : British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's "Voyage of Discovery" to Moscow for Talks with Khrushchev Concerning Tension over Berlin (25 February 1959) = 175
• Document 137 : President Eisenhower Meets with Congressional Leaders (6 March 1959) = 176
• Document 138 : President Eisenhower's Radio-TV Address on Berlin (16 March 1959) = 177
• Document 139 : President Eisenhower's Effort to Provide Khrushchev with "a Remarkable Diplomatic retreat" (27 May 1959) = 178
• Document 140 : Following Their "Kitchen Debate" in Moscow, vice President Richard Nixon and Chairman Khrushchev Discuss East-West Tension (July 1959) = 179
• Document 141 : Four Power (Britain, France, USSR, and U.S.) Communiqu$$e'$$ Agreeing to a Negotiated Settlement of Situation in Germany and Berlin (5 August 1959) = 179
• The Berlin Crisis of 1961 = 181
• KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV = 181
• Document 142 : President Adviser Charles Bohlen's Memoirs on the Vienna Summit Between Soviet Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy (3-4 June 1961) = 181
• Document 143 : Secretary of State Dean Rusk Recalls President Kennedy's Prediction of "a Very Cold Winter" Following the Vienna Summit (3-4 June 1961) = 182
• Document 144 : Aid-M$$
• e'$$moire from Soviets to President Kennedy Proposing "Peace Treaty" with Germany and "Free City" of West Berlin (4 June 1961) = 183
• Document 145 : Secretary Rusk Recalls Drafting the State Department's Reply to Soviets' Aide-M$$\grave e$$moire (Mid-June 1961) = 184
• Document 146 : Presidential Adviser Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Notes the Debate Stirred in the Kennedy Administration over the "Hawkish" Acheson Memorandum on Berlin (July 1961) = 185
• Document 147 : Soviet Defector Colonel Oleg Penkovsky Provides Information to the West on Khrushchev's Plans and Soviet Nuclear Capabilities (July 1961) = 187
• Document 148 : "The Penkiovskiy Papers" and Their Insight on Soviet Military Preparedness and Khrushchev's Rhetorical Bluff on Berlin (July 1961) = 188
• THE BERLIN WALL = 190
• Document 149 : Nikita Khrushchev Remembers the Berlin Crisis of 1961 (1974) = 190
• Document 150 : Secretary Rusk's Reaction and Response to the Wall (August 1961) = 191
• Document 151 : Secretary Rusk Remarks that Germans "Voted with Their Feet" to Flee Comunism in East Germany (13 August 1961) = 192
• Document 152 : President Kennedy's Memorandum on the American Response to the Berlin Wall (14 August 1961) = 193
• Document 153 : State Department's Berlin Steering Group Reacts to the Berlin Wall (15 August 1961) = 193
• Document 154 : American Note to USSR Condemning the Berlin Wall (17 August 1961) = 194
• Document 155 : Presidential Adviser Reports on Vice President Lyndon Johnson's Trip to Berlin and Reinforcement of the Berlin Garrison (17-19 August 1961) = 195
• Document 156 : President Kennedy's Memo to Secretary of State Rusk (28 August 1961) = 197
• Document 157 : Secretary Rusk's Negotiations with British Foreign Minister Douglas-Home and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko (September-October 1961) = 198
• Document 158 : Secretary Rusk Remembers His Discussions with Foreign Minister Grmoyko and Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and Khrushchev's "Squeeze" Metaphor (1962-1963) = 198
• Document 159 : Circular Telegram from Secretary Rusk to All U.S. Embassies on Possible Link of Cuban Missile Crisis to Tension over Berlin (24 October 1962) = 199
• Document 160 : Presidential Adviser Clark Clifford Makes a Connection Between the Superpower Tension over Berlin and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1961-1962) = 200
• Document 161 : Nikita Khrushchev Recalls "Unpleasant Incidents" at the Berlin Wall (1974) = 201
• Document 162 : President Kennedy's "ich bin ein Berliner" ["I Am a Berliner"] Speech at the Rudolph Wilde Platz in Berlin (26 June 1963) = 201
• PART Ⅴ : The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962 = 205
• CHRONOLOGY = 206
• NUCLEAR BRINKSMANSHIP = 207
• Document 163 : National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy Comments on Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell gilpatric's Speech Designed to Expose the Soviets' Pretension to Nuclear Superiority (October 1961) = 207
• Document 164 : Robert Kennedy's "The Cuba Project" with Plan for Operation Mongoose to Overthrow the Regime of Fidel Castro (20 February 1962) = 209
• Document 165 : Nikita Khrushchev's Objective to Defend Cuba from U.S. Invasion (Spring 1962) = 210
• Document 166 : Soviet Chief of Staff General Anatoly Gribkov Comments on Operation Anadyr, Summer-Fall 1962 (Havana Conference, 1992) = 211
• Document 167 : Draft Cuban-Soviet Agreement on Military Cooperation and Mutual Defense in the Event of Aggression (never signed) (August 1962) = 214
• Document 168 : CIA Director J
• ohn McCone's "Honeymoon Cables from Paris" Directing Extensive Search for Soviet Medium - Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba (7-20 September 1962) = 215
• Document 169 : CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 85-3-62, "The Military Buildup in Cuba" (19 September 1962) = 217
• Document 170 : Soviet Defector Oleg Penkovsky, Code Name HERO, Provides Western Intelligence with Vital Information on Soviet Nuclear Capability (June 1962) = 218
• Document 171 : Soviet Historian Sergei Khrushchev Asks What Impact Western Intelligence Sources Had on U.S. Policymakers' Attitudes about Soviet Nuclear Capability in 1962 (Havana Conference, 1992) = 219
• Document 172 : The View that Cuba Had Reason to Prepare for U.S. Invasion and that Policymakers Must "Stand in the Other Guy's Shoes," Summer 1962 (Moscow Conference, 1989) = 221
• Document 173 : The View that Placing Nuclear Missiles in Cuba Was Khrushchev's Gambit to Alter the East-West "Correlation of Forces," Summer 1962 (Havana Conference, 1992) = 222
• MISSILES OF OCTOBER = 224
• Document 174 : Imagery Confirmation of Offensive Missiles in Cuba (14-15 October 1962) = 224
• Document 175 : CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center Memo on "Mission 3101" (16 October 1962) = 224
• Document 176 : CIA Operations Officer Richard Helms' Memorandum on Operation Mongoose as the Covert Effort to Overthrow or Remove Castro from Power in Cuba (16 October 1962) = 225
• Document 177 : Attorney General Robert Kennedy's Account of the NSC's "Executive Committee" (Ex Comm) and Its Initial Decisions (17-20 October 1962) = 226
• Document 178 : Memorandum by Ambassador Charles Bohlen, a Soviet-Specialist State Department Officer and Presidential Adviser, to President Kennedy (18 October 1962) = 228
• Document 179 : The LET [Presidential Adviser Llewellyn E. Thompson?] Memo on Behalf of Air Strike Option (19 October 1962) = 228
• Document 180 : Conclusions of CIA Estimate "Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba" Which Incorporate Sensitive Penkovsky "IRONBARK" Debriefings (18-19 October 1962) = 229
• Document 181 : Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-18-62 : Possible Soviet Reactions to U.S. Action (19 October 1962) = 230
• Document 182 : Secretary of State Dean Rusk Recalls the Opposing Opinions of Ex Comm Members, and Meeting with Congressional Leaders (17-22 October 1962) = 231
• Document 183 : National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy Describes the Dilemma over the Air Strike or the Blockade Response (16-20 October 1962) = 233
• Document 184 : Press Secretary Pierre Salinger's "White Lie" that President Kennedy Has "a Cold" (20 October 1962) = 233
• Document 185 : Press Secretary Salinger Recalls Plan to Convert National Government to Wartime Posture (21 October 1962) = 234
• Document 186 : CIA Memo Suggests Vice President Lyndon Johnson Favored Surprise Air Strike Against Soviet Missile Sites in Cuba (21 October 1962) = 234
• Document 187 : President Kennedy Speaks to the American People (22 October 1962) = 235
• Document 188 : President Castro's Speech to the Cuban People (22 October 1962) = 237
• Document 189 : Soviet General Gribkov Comments on Readiness of Soviet Forces in Cuba, 22 October 1962 (Havana Conference, 1992) = 237
• Document 190 : Dean Rusk Recalls the American Diplomatic Effort to Resolve the Crisis (23-25 October 1962) = 238
• Document 191 : Robert Kennedy Recalls a Stressful Ex Comm Meeting (24 October 1962) = 239
• Document 192 : Secretary of State Rusk's "Eyeball to Eyeball" Remark (25 October 1962) = 240
• Document 193 : UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's Speech to "the Courtroom of World Opinion" (25 October 1962) = 240
• Document 194 : Dean Rusk Recalls the Confusing Signals from Soviet Sources and American Perception that Khrushchev Was Losing Control (26 October 1962) = 241
• Document 195 : General Gribkov Emphasizes that a Soviet Officer Ordered, and a Soviet Missile Crew Executed, the Shootdown of the American U-2 on 27 October 1962 (Havana Conference, 1992) = 242
• Document 196 : Fidel Castro Presents the Cuban Perspective for Downing the American U-2 on 27 October 1962 (Havana Conference, 1992) = 243
• Document 197 : Two Soviet Generals Describe the Russian Perspective Behind the Downing of the American U-2 by a Soviet Missile Crew on 27 October 1962 (Havana Conference, 1992) = 244
• Document 198 : Khrushchev's "Hard" Cable to Kennedy Proposing Swap of Soviet Missiles in Cuba for U.S. "Analogous Weapons" in Turkey (27 October 1962) = 245
• Document 199 : U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Cables Turkish Objections to American-Soviet Missile Swap (27 October 1962) = 246
• Document 200 : Secretary of State Rusk Recalls Decision to Swap U.S. Missiles in Turkey for Soviet Missiles in Cuba (27 Ocotober 1962) = 247
• Document 201 : Robert Kennedy's Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin over Status of U.S. Missiles in Turkey (27 October 1962) = 249
• Document 202 : Secretary of State Rusk Remembers the "Cordier Ploy" to Swap Missiles Through UN Auspices (27 October 1962) = 250
• Document 203 : President Kennedy Decides to Respond to Khrushchev's "Soft" Cable (27 October 1962) = 251
• Document 204 : Khrushchev's Cable to Remove Missiles from Cuba (28 October 1962) = 252
• Document 205 : President Kennedy's Reply to Chairman Khrushchev (28 October 1962) = 252
• Document 206 : Fidel Castro-Nikita Khrushchev Correspondence (26-31 October 1962) = 253
• CLOSE CALL = 256
• Document 207 : General Gribkov's Most Humiliating Experience, November 1962 (Havana conference, 1992) = 256
• Document 208 : President Kennedy's News Conference Lifting the "Quarantine" of Cuba (20 November 1962) = 256
• Document 209 : Ambassador Charles Bohlen's Assessment of the Crisis (1969) = 257
• Document 210 : Fidel Castro Asks Robert McNamara When Nuclear Balance Was Achieved Between the United States and the Soviet Union (Havana Conferences, 1992) = 258
• Document 211 : CIA Report on U.S. Intelligence Agencies' Effectiveness During the Crisis (28 February 1963) = 259
• Document 212 : Robert McNamara and Fidel Castro Discuss the Role of the Soviet Lunas in the Defense of Cuba and Their Relevance to the Crisis (Havana Conference, 1992) = 260
• PART VI : The War in Vietnam, 1954-1975 = 263
• CHRONOLOGY = 264
• THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND THE EISENHOWER-KENNEDY COURSE, 1954-1963 = 266
• Document 213 : Geneva Conference's Indochina Cease-Fire Armistice (20 July 1954) = 267
• Document 214 : Report Detailing Efforts by CIA Operative Colonel Edward Lansdale and the Saigon Military Mission to Shore Up Diem Government in South (1954-1955) = 268
• Document 215 : Ngo Dinh Diem Statement Concerning Consultative Preparations for the 1956 Election of National Reunification (16 July 1955) = 269
• Document 216 : National Security Council Directive 5612 on U.S. Policy Toward North Vietnam (5 September 1956) = 269
• Document 217 : North Vietnam's Communist Party General Secretary, Le Duan, Provides Guidelines to North vietnam's Lao dong Party for "The Path of Revolution in the South" (November 1956) = 270
• Document 218 : U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Eldridge Durbrow Reports on the Diem Government in Saigon and Viet Cong Intentions and Potential in South Vietnam (7 March 1960) = 271
• Document 219 : National Security Council's Policy Planning for Counterinsurgency in Vietnam (19 June 1960) = 272
• THE GULF OF TONKIN AND THE AMERICANIZATION OF VIETNAM'S WAR, 1964-1967 = 273
• Document 220 : Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (JCSM) 471-64, "Objectives and Courses of Action-Southeast Asia " with Chairman Maxwell Taylor's Addendum (2-5 June 1964) = 274
• Document 221 : U.S. Undersecretary of State George Ball's Discussion with French President Charles de Gaulle (5 June 1964) = 275
• Document 222 : CIA Estimate on the "Domino Effect" in the Far Ease (9 June 1964) = 276
• Document 223 : President Johnson's Tonkin Gulf Message to Congress (5 August 1964) = 277
• Document 224 : Senator Wayne Morse Questions Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and Explains His Opposition to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (6 August 1964) = 278
• Document 225 : Gulf of Tonkin Resolution Empowering the President to Use American Forces in Southeast Asia (7 August 1964) = 279
• Document 226 : "May 2nd Movement" and Student Opposition to War (August 1964) = 280
• Document 227 : North Vietnam's Foreign Minister Xuan Thuy Responds to U.S. complaint at the United Nations (19 August 1964) = 280
• Document 228 : The North Vietnamese Article "Facing the Skyhawks" Reports the Capture of One of the First American Prisoners of War in Vietnam (1964) = 281
• Document 229 : Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's "Sagging Limb" Memo to President Johnson (9 December 1964) = 281
• Document 230 : U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk's Conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on U.S.-USSR Relations in Southeast Asia (9 December 1964) = 283
• Document 231 : Hanoi's Four Point Negotiation Position (8 April 1965) = 283
• Document 232 : Undersecretary of State George Ball Argues Against Escalating U.S. Involvement (18 June 1965) = 284
• Document 233 : Undersecretary of State Ball Recalls His "Compromise Solution" (1 July 1965) = 285
• Document 234 : U.S. Commanding General in Vietnam William Westmoreland Recommends a Buildup of U.S. Troops (June-July 1965) = 286
• Document 235 : Undersecretary of State Ball Recalls the National Security Meeting at Which President Johnson Decided on Massive Troop Deployment to Vietnam (21 July 1965) = 287
• Document 236 : Senator Mansfield Urges President Johnson Not to Get Enmeshed in Vietnam (27 July 1965) = 290
• Document 237 : President Johnson Confers with Congressional Leaders (27 July 1965) = 291
• Document 238 : President Johnson Recalls His Vantage Point for Decision (July 1965) = 291
• Document 239 : President Johnson's Decision for Massive American Effort (July 1965) = 292
• Document 240 : Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara Evaluates the Bombing Program Against North Vietnam for President Johnson (30 July 1965) = 293
• Document 241 : Secretary of Defense McNamara Encourages President Johnson to Escalate the War (30 November 1965) = 294
• Document 242 : Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton's Memorandum that U.S. Objective Is to Avoid Humiliation (19 January 1966) = 294
• Document 243 : Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge's Telegram to Secretary of State Rusk on Failure of Italian-Polish Diplomatic Channel of Talks ("Marigold") with Hanoi (24 July 1966) = 295
• Document 244 : Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "Declaration of Independence from the War in Vietnam" and the Growing Cynicism of American Troops (4 April 1967) = 296
• Document 245 : President Johnson's "San Antonio Formula" (September-October 1967) = 298
• Document 246 : Secretary of State Rusk's Remarks on Containment of China (16 October 1967) = 299
• THE TET OFFENSIVE AND THE CHANGE OF COURSE, JANUARY-DECEMBER 1968 = 300
• Document 247 : Senator Robert Kennedy Comments During Interview that U.S. Security Is Independent of Any Victory Against the "Great Threat of Asian Communism" (26 November 1967) = 300
• Document 248 : President Johnson Remembers the Tet Offensive (January 1968) = 301
• Document 249 : Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Tet Offensive as a Turning Point in America's Policy Toward Vietnam (31 January 1958) = 302
• Document 250 : Senator Eugene McCarthy Advocates a Greater Emphasis on U.S. Social Problem than on Military Action in Vietnam (March 1968) = 303
• Document 251 : Clark Clifford Recalls "the Tuesday Lunch" with President Johnson and the Decision to Call Together "the Wise Men" (19 March 1968) = 303
• Document 252 : Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford Recalls the "Most Distinguished Dinner PArty" at the U.S. State Department (25-26 March 1968) = 304
• Document 253 : President Johnson Decides Not to Seek Reelection (31 March 1968) = 304
• Document 254 : Inquiry into the Massacre at My Lai, Vietnam (16-19 March 1968) = 305
• Document 255 : An Infantryman's Cynical Perspective of the War (1968) = 307
• Document 256 : Flyer Distributed to Demonstrate Against the War at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago (28 August 1968) = 308
• THE NIXON-KISSINGER STRATEGY FOR THE VIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR, 1969-1972 = 309
• Document 257 : President Nixon's Eight-Point Stratefy to End the War (14 May 1969) = 309
• Document 258 : President Nixon's Speech Calling for the "Vietnamization" of the War and His Appeal to "the Great Silent Majority" (3 November 1969) = 310
• Document 259 : President Nixon Decides to Invade Cambodia (26 April 1970) = 312
• Document 260 : The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall, Panel 10W, Line 3 (11 November 1982) = 313
• Document 261 : The Student Mobilization Committee Platform (22 November 1970) = 314
• Document 262 : John Kerry's Testimony of the "Winter Soldier Investigation" for the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (22 April 1971) = 315
• Document 263 : Tape Recordings by President Nixon's Chief of Staff, H. R. Haldeman, Reveal Nixon's Reaction to "the Pentagon Papers" (13-15 June 1971) = 318
• Document 264 : Henry Kissinger Remembers President Nixon's "China Initiative" and Exigencies of Realpolitik in Negotiations with Hanoi (January-February 1972) = 319
• Document 265 : Henry Kissinger's "Peace Is at Hand" Statement (October 26, 1972) = 320
• PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT AND FALL OF SAIGON = 320
• Document 266 : President Nixon Urges South Vietnamese President Thieu to Accept the Inescapable conclusion of the War by Jointly Signing the Paris Peace Agreement (January 1973) = 321
• Document 267 : Paris Peace Agreement to End Hostilities in Vietnam (27 January 1973) = 321
• Document 268 : Secretary of State Kissinger Recalls President Nixon's Promise of Economic Reconstruction Aid for North Vietnam after Peace Accord (1 February 1973) = 323
• Document 269 : Public Law 93-52, the Fulbright-Aiken Amendment Prohibiting U.S. Military Activity in Indochina (1 July 1973) = 324
• Document 270 : War Powers Resolution of the U.S. congress (7 November 1973) = 325
• Document 271 : U.S. Defense Attach$$e'$$ Report of Fall of South Vietnam (May 1973) = 326
• VIETNAM RETROSPECTIVES, 1976-1995 = 327
• Document 272 : General Westmoreland Blames the Press, Student Protestors, Domestic Politics, and Flawed Military Stratefy for U.S. Defeat in Vietnam (1976) = 328
• Document 273 : Secretary Kissinger's Lessons for America from the Vietnam War (1994) = 328
• Document 274 : Dean Rusk's and Robert McNama's Retrospective Memoirs (1990, 1995) = 329
• Document 275 : Following the Persian Gulf war Against Iraq, President George Bush Declares that America Has Kicked the "Vietnam Syndrome" (1-4 March 1991) = 330
• PART Ⅶ : The Iranian Revolution and Hostage Crisis, 1978-1981 = 333
• CHRONOLOGY = 334
• EISENHOWER-NIXON LEGACY, 1953-1976 = 335
• Document 276 : National Security Council's Discussion of Iranian Oil, National Prestige, and Effects on U.S. Security (11 March 1953) = 336
• Document 277 : Operation Ajax as CIA Countercoup for "Boy Scout" (3 August 1953) = 336
• Document 278 : Shah Asserts Countercoup Was Popular Mandate for His Monarchy (13-19 August 1953) = 337
• Document 279 : Message from President Eisenhower to the Shah (24 August 1953) = 338
• Document 280 : U.S. Foreign Service Officer's Dispatch from Tehran (15 June 1964) = 338
• Document 281 : Secretary of State Henry Kissinger Links the Strategy of Selling American Weaponry to Iran as Counterbalance to Soviet-Iraqi Treaty (1972) = 339
• CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND FALL OF THE SHAH, 1977-1978 = 340
• Document 282 : National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski Links the Nixon-Kissionger Persian Gulf Strategy with Carter Administration's Objectives (1977-1978) = 340
• Document 283 : Secretary of State Cyrus Vance Discusses the Carter Administration's Review of Human Rights in Iran (1977) = 341
• Document 284 : President Carter and Shah Teargassed on South Lawn of White House (15 November1977) = 342
• Document 285 : Shah Recalls President Carter's Remark that Iran Was an "Island of Stability" (31 December 1977) = 342
• Document 286 : Empress Farah's Private Secretary Recalls the Spark that Ignited the Revolution and the Symbolism of the Chador (January 1978) = 343
• Document 287 : Shah Blames "the Unholy Alliance of Red and Black" for Collapse of His Monarchy (January-February 1978) = 344
• Document 288 : Shah's Twin Sister Recalls Her Brother's Restraint in the Use of Force to Quell the Rioting in Iran (February 1978) = 345
• Document 289 : The Shah Uses SAVAK Against the Growing Strength of Islamic fundamentalists in Iran (1978) = 345
• Document 290 : British Ambassador to Iran Anthony Parsons Describes the Shah's Loss of Morale (October 1978) = 346
• Document 291 : U.S. Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan Transmits His "Thinking the Unthinkable" Cable to Washington (November 1978) = 347
• Document 292 : National Security Adviser Brzezinski Recalls Overload on Decision-Making Circuits (Fall 1978) = 348
• Document 293 : Ambassador Sullivan Recommends a Voluntary Exodus of Americans from Iran (December 1978) = 349
• Document 294 : Presidential Adviser George Ball's Reproach of the NSC and His Recommendation to President Carter to Retract U.S. Support of Shah (December 1978) = 349
• Document 295 : In an Interview with an Iranian Reporter, the Shah Blames British and American Oil Companies for the Iranian Revolution (25 December 1978) = 351
• CRISIS SWELLS IN ADVERSARIAL IRAN, JANUARY-NOVEMBER 1979 = 351
• Document 296 : NSC Adviser Brzezinski Writes Memo with Plan "C" Calling for Iranian Military Coup (18 January 1979) = 352
• Document 297 : U.S. Embassy in Tehran and Consulate in Tabriz Seized (14 February 1979) = 353
• Document 298 : A U.S. Intelligence Offical Links the Iranian Revolution with Collapse of SALT Ⅱ (March 1979) = 354
• Document 299 : Rosalynn Carter Recalls Pressure for an Entry Visa for "Mr. Pahlavi" (April-October 1979) = 355
• Document 300 : Adviser Brzezinski Describes Iranian Revolution's Impact on U.S. Security (1979) = 355
• EMBASSY SEIZURE AND REACTIONS, NOVEMBER 1979 = 356
• Document 301 : The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (18 April 1961) = 357
• Document 302 : U.S. Embassy-Tehran Informs State Department Ops Center that Compound Is under Siego (4 November 1979) = 358
• Document 303 : President Carter's Crisis-Management and Decision-Making Process Within the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) (November 1979) = 359
• Document 304 : National Security Council Aide Gary Sick Recalls the SCC Discussion on the Rescue or Military Retaliation Options (6 November 1979) = 360
• Document 305 : President Carter Meets with Hostages' Families (9 November 1979) = 362
• Document 306 : A Hostage Assesses the Embassy Seizure by Militants (November 1979) = 362
• Document 307 : CIA Director Stansfield Turner meets with Ross Perot Concerning Rescue Operation (10-12 November 1979) = 363
• Document 308 : President Carter Orders Economic Sanctions Against Purchase of Iranian Oil (12 November 1979) = 365
• Document 309 : Iranian Captors Release Female and African-American Hostages (19 November 1979) = 365
• Document 310 : CIA Director Turner Remembers President Carter Calling an SCC Meeting at Camp David (23 November 1979) = 366
• Document 311 : CIA Director Turner Lists President Carter's 2-2-2 Strategy (28 November 1979) = 367
• Document 312 : President Carter's News Conference with Comments on Terrorism and His "Rose Garden Strategy" (28 November 1979) = 367
• FAILED NEGOTIATIONS AND SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN, NOVEMBER 1979-MARCH 1980 = 368
• Document 313 : Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's Application for Interim Measures of Protection with the International Court of Justice (29 November 1979) = 369
• Document 314 : State Department Legal Adviser Roberts Owen's Arguments before the International Court of Justice (29 November 1979) = 369
• Document 315 : Stansfield Turner Remembers the Vance-Brzezinski "Two-Horse" Policy Dispute (November 1979) = 371
• Document 316 : Iranian Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr's Memoirs on the Mullahs' Political Goals with American Hostages (November 1979) = 373
• Document 317 : American Hostage Moorhead Kennedy Recalls His Captors' Motives (December 1979) = 375
• Document 318 : Rosalynn Carter Recalls the 1980 Presidential Campaign (December 1979) = 376
• Document 319 : National Security Council's Gary Sick Stresses the geopolitical Impact of the soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979) = 376
• Document 320 : Address by President Carter Emphasizes Doctrine to Defend Persian Gulf Oil Supplies Following Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (23 January 1980) = 377
• Document 321 : Secretary Vance Communicates to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim American Six-Point Diplomatic Position to Resolve Crisis (12 January 1980) = 378
• Document 322 : Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh Meets Secretly with Presidential Adviser Hamilton Jordan in Paris Concerning Plot to Assassinate the Exiled Shah (17 February 1980) = 379
• Document 323 : The Jordan-Ghotbzadeh Draft Agreement Between the Carter Administration and the Iranian Government of President Bani-Sadr (March 1980) = 380
• MILITARY RESCUE, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, AND THE 1980 ELECTION, MARCH-NOVEMBER 1980 = 381
• Document 324 : NSC Aide Recalls When the Military Option Comes to Fore (22 March 1980) = 381
• Document 325 : President Carter Frustrated at Inability to Resolve Crisis by the Jordan-Ghotbzadeh Diplomatic Channel (30 March-11 April 1980) = 383
• Document 326 : Press Secretary Jody Powell Comments on Charges that Carter Administration Played Domestic Politics with the Hostage Crisis (1 April 1980) = 385
• Document 327 : President Carter Announces Sanctions Against Iran (7 April 1980) = 386
• Document 328 : President Carter Decides on Military Rescue Option Following the Collapse of the Jordan-Ghotbzadeh Agreement (11-15 April 1980) = 387
• Document 329 : President Carter's Speech Announcing Further Restrictions Against Iran (17 April 1980) = 388
• Document 330 : Secretary of State Vance decides to Resign (21 April 1980) = 389
• Document 331 : President Carter's War Powers Report to Congress on the Abortive Hostage Rescur Operation in IRan (26 April 1980) = 390
• Document 332 : Iranian President Bani-Sadr Contends that Jordan-Ghotbzadeh Agreement for Hostage Release Was Scrubbed after Khomeini-Reagan Contacts (April-October 1980) = 392
• Document 333 : An American Embassy Hostage Recalls Discovering that Air Attacks Against Tehran Were Part of Iran-Iraq War (22 September 1980) = 394
• REAL BARGAINING AFTER THE 1980 ELECTION, NOVEMBER 1980-JANUARY 1981 = 394
• Document 334 : Hostage Barry Rosen Remembers First Anniversary of His Capture (4 November 1980) = 395
• Document 335 : NSC Adviser Brzezinski Reflects upon the Final Months of the Carter Presidency (November 1980-January 1981) = 395
• Document 336 : Islamic Iran's Terms for Release of the Hostages (2 November 1980) = 396
• Document 337 : Declarations and Agreements of Algiers Accords (19-20 January 1981) = 397
• ENDGAME : LESSONS FOR PRESIDENTS AND CITIZENS = 400
• Document 338 : A Hostage's Perspective on the Effect of the Crisis on America (1981) = 400
• Document 339 : New York Times Columnist Reports that President Carter's Priority Was to "Put the Hostages' Lives First" (1981) = 400
• Document 340 : American Hostage Charg$$e'$$ d' Affaires to Iran Bruce Laingen Comments on Family Liaison Action Group and the "Yellow Ribbon" Campaign in the United States (1992) = 401
• PART VIII: The Persian Gulf War with Iraq, 1990-1991 = 403
• CHRONOLOGY = 404
• A BORDER DISPUTE AMONG ARABS, 1932-1990 = 405
• Document 341 : Iraqi Prime Minister and Kuwaiti Ruler Reaffirm the Kuwait-Iraq Border Drawn at the 193 UK-Turkish London Convention (July-August 1932) = 405
• Document 342 : Agreed Minutes of Borders Between Kuwait and Iraq (4 October 1963) = 406
• U.S RESPONDS TO IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT WITH DESERT SHIELD, AUGUST-DECEMBER 1990 = 407
• Document 343 : Text of the Meeting Between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and U.S. Ambassador April C. Glaspie, as Released by the Government of Iraq (25 July 1990) = 407
• Document 344 : U.S. Ambassador the Kuwait W. Nathaniel Howell Recalls Iraqi Siege of U.S. Embassy (2 August-13 December 1990) = 412
• Document 345 : U.S. Charg$$e'$$ in Baghdad Joseph C. Wilson Ⅳ Meets with Saddam Hussein (6 August 1990) = 413
• Document 346 : Vice President Dan Quayle Recalls Decision to Begin Operation Desert Shield to Protect Saudi Arabia from Possible Iraqi Invasion (2 August 1990) = 418
• Document 347 : President Bush Announces Decision to Send U.S. Troops to Saudi Arabia, the Guiding Principles to His "This Will Not Stand" Position (8 August 1990) = 420
• Document 348 : An American Hostage Recalls How He and Other Civilians Were Captured Attempting to Flee Kuwait (August 1990) = 421
• Document 379 : General Schwarzkopf Concludes Cease-fire with Iraqi Generals at Safwan Airfield (3 March 1991) = 455
• THE AFTERMATH OF ARMS OVER DIPLOMACY, 1991-1993 = 458
• Document 380 : President Bush's Address Before Joint Session of Congress (6 March 1991) = 458
• Document 381 : Synopsis of UN Resolutions Relating to Iraq's Defeat by UN Coalition of Forces (March-September 1991) = 458
• Document 382 : Findings of U.S. Army Report on Iraqi War Crimes (8 January 1992) = 460
• Index = 463