Designs for democratic stability : studies in viable constitutionalism

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• Contributors = ⅸ
• Acknowledgments = xii
• 1 Viable Constitutionalism and Democratic Political Stability / Abdo I. Baaklini = 3
• Part One Important Characteristics of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems of Government
• 2 The "Westminster Model" Away from Westminster : Is it Always the Most Appropriate Model? / Gregory S. Mahler = 35
• 3 The U. S. Presidential System as a Model for the World / James L. Sundquist = 53
• 4 Bureaucracy : Control, Responsiveness, Performance / Joel D. Aberbach ; Bert A. Rockman = 73
• 5 Bureaucracy and Viable Constitutionalism / Fred W Riggs = 95
• 6 Legislative Structure and Constitutional Viability in Societies Undergoing Democratic Transition / Abdo I. Baaklini = 127
• Part Two Case Studies in Designing a Viable Constitution
• 7 The Constitution as an Instrument of Political Cohesion in Postcolonial States : The Case of India, 1950-1993 / T. V. Sathyamurthy = 147
• 8 Constitutional Viability and Political Institutions in Turkish Democracy / Ersin Kalaycio$$\breve {g}$$lu = 179
• 9 Can Viable Constitutionalism Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? / Erik P. Hoffmann = 211
• Part Three Limitations of Constitutionalism
• 10 Democratic Consolidation : Institutional, Economic, and External Dimensions / Diane Ethier = 259
• 11 Globalization and the Residual State : The Challenge to Viable Constitutionalism / Philip G. Cerny = 285